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This study explores the application of blockchain technology to recordkeeping 
practices. To that end, two blockchain-based recordkeeping platforms—
ARCHANGEL and RecordsKeeper—were evaluated according to the three criteria 
outlined in T. D. Smith’s evaluation framework for blockchain-based recordkeeping 
platforms—dependabilty, security, and trust.  
 
The results of these two evaluations demonstrate blockchain technology’s inability to 
provide viable long-term solutions for sustainable records management as yet. This 
study also suggests supplementing Smith’s framework with more blockchain-specific 
questions to ensure a more comprehensive evaluation of the use of blockchain in such 
platforms. Finally, this study recommends adding a fourth criteria, sustainability, to 
the framework.  
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 2 
1 Introduction 
With its introduction into the financial and technology sectors in 2007 as the 
distributed ledger technology underlying the digital currency bitcoin,1 blockchain 
technology has quickly spread beyond the realm of cryptocurrency and finance to other 
fields. Perhaps no other technology since the internet has managed to capture the interest, 
resources, and imagination of such a wide variety of public and private institutions as 
blockchain has in just the last few years (Mougayer, 2016). Described by The 
International Research on Permanent Authentic Records in Electronic Systems 
(InterPARES) as “an open-source technology that supports trusted, immutable records of 
transactions stored in publicly accessible, decentralized, distributed, automated ledgers,” 
blockchain technology still lacks a standard definition (Pearce-Moses, Duranti, Michetti, 
Andaur, Banard, Barlaoura & Pan, 2017). Regardless of its definition, what ultimately 
makes blockchain technology so compelling is its potential to eliminate the need for 
trusted third parties and ability to generate secure, immutable records.  
As a result, a steady stream of investors, developers, and dreamers continue to 
explore blockchain-based solutions for issues great and small. Describing the high hopes 
some blockchain advocates hold for the future of the technology, Klint Finley writes: 
Its biggest boosters believe blockchains can not only replace central banks 
but usher in new era of online services outside the control of internet 
                                                
1 Bitcoin with a capital “B” refers to Bitcoin software, technologies and/or protocols, while bitcoin with the 
lower case “b” refers to the digital coin. (Bitcoin Project, n.d.) 
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giants like Facebook and Google. These new-age apps would be 
impossible to censor, advocates say, and would be more answerable to 
users. (2018) 
 
Accordingly, banks, private businesses, start-ups, tech firms and even some governments 
betting on such potential, have begun to develop blockchain-based applications to solve 
problems ranging from managing agricultural supply chains, transferring ownership of 
deeds and titles, preventing voter fraud, providing secure digital identities for refugees 
and homeless persons, managing electronic health records, sharing and archiving 
genomic research data and more (Galen et al., 2018).  
 Skeptics of blockchain, on the other hand, argue that blockchain technology has 
been overhyped. While some staunch critics feel that blockchain is just a passing fad with 
no future (Stinchcombe, 2018; Volpicelli, 2018; Walker, 2018), others feel that 
considerably more research and conceptual development is needed for it to live up to its 
purported potential (Galen et al., 2018; Lemieux, 2016a; Pisa and Juden, 2017; Zīle and 
Strazdiņa, 2018). As many critics have noted, while technological development and 
investment into blockchain has grown exponentially within the last few years, critical 
research evaluating it has not (Lemieux, 2016a; Zīle and Strazdiņa, 2018). Notably, in 
their recent article “Blockchain Use Cases and Their Feasibilty” (2018), Kaspars Zīle and 
Renāte Strazdiņa point out various obstacles to the successful implementation of 
blockchain, including ongoing technical issues with blockchain technology, differing 
understandings of the uses and goals of blockchain technology and an overall lack of 
available research about blockchain (Zīle and Strazdiņa, 2018). Having surveyed much of 
the available research on block chain, Zīle and Strazdiņa (2018) observe that much of this 
research is either focused primarily on Bitcoin blockchain or security and privacy 
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improvements. There is thus, a general tendency to ignore other blockchain technologies, 
potential applications for blockchain, and technological issues.  
Zīle and Strazdiņa (2018) also noted that aside from limited scientific articles and 
a few books on blockchain, much of the published materials consist of articles and white 
papers published by developers and enthusiasts on blogs and discussion boards. While 
those articles and white papers provide some interesting technical details and descriptions 
of various blockchain technologies, overall most of the available material on blockchain 
does not enable larger theoretical framing of blockchain technologies, comparisons of 
various applications or even a standard definition of blockchain (Zīle and Strazdiņa, 
2018).  
In a similar vein, though focused more specifically on blockchain solutions for 
archival preservation and recordkeeping, Victoria Lemieux (2016a) notes in “Blockchain 
Technology for RecordKeeping: Help or Hype?” that without the critical analysis and 
evaluation of blockchain technology that more comparative and theoretical research 
might produce, it becomes harder to assess the relevance and effectiveness of using 
blockchain technology for any one particular application. Put simply, without 
frameworks for evaluation, how does one separate fact from fiction––or rather, true 
potential from hype––when it comes to using blockchain technology for a particular 
application?  
 This paper seeks to explore that question by using an evaluation framework to 
assess two blockchain-based recordkeeping solutions: ARCHANGEL and 
RecordsKeeper.  More specifically, by using the evaluation framework developed by 
T.D. Smith (2017) in his recent article “The Blockchain Litmus Test,” this paper will 
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examine how well these two blockchain-based solutions execute recordkeeping functions. 
Smith’s framework seeks to determine the overall utility of blockchain-based systems by 
rating the project’s performance in three primary categories: dependability, security and 
trust. While Smith applies his framework to the Bitcoin blockchain and four other 
blockchain-based initiatives, this paper seeks to expand his work by appraising two 
specific blockchain-based recordkeeping projects that have not yet been evaluated by 
Smith’s framework. In addition to analyzing the assessments of ARCHANGEL and 
Recordkeeper resulting from application of Smith’s framework, insights regarding the 
application of Smith’s framework and suggestions for improving such assessments will 
then be discussed.  
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 What is Blockchain? 
 
At present, there is no consensus regarding a standard definition for blockchain. 
Similarly, concepts to attach to any potential definition are just as varied. Defining 
blockchain is complicated by the fact that the term is used in different ways. “The 
blockchain,” “a blockchain,” “blockchain,” and “blockchain technology” when used, may 
refer to the same or different things depending on the context. Thus, the term blockchain 
has been (and can still be) used to refer to: 1) a data structure  2) an algorithm 3) the 
specific distributed ledger system underlying Bitcoin 4) derivative distributed ledger 
systems based off of the original Bitcoin blockchain ledger, or 5) the blockchain concept 
itself—a distributed  peer-to-peer system—with no specific implementation in mind 
(Burniske & Tartare, 2017; Drescher, 2017). The blockchain-based recordkeeping 
solutions assessed in this paper fall under the fourth category listed above.  
 To be able to understand the derivative blockchain systems and the assessments 
included in this study requires some fundamental background regarding the Bitcoin 
blockchain, types of blockchains, and the Ethereum blockchain. This section will provide 
an overview of the Bitcoin blockchain, which includes its origins, how it functions, and 
potential vulnerabilities. The section will expand further to discuss the differences 
between public and private blockchains. Another prominent blockchain platform
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Ethereum, will be introduced, particularly to examine the use of “smart contracts” in 
blockchain.  
The Bitcoin blockchain was first detailed in 2008 when a person (or group of 
people) under the pseudonym of Satoshi Nakamoto2 published a white paper titled 
“Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System.” (2008). Published on the 
cryptography listserve metzdown.com, the white paper detailed Nakamoto’s concept of 
bitcoin, as well as the Bitcoin blockchain technology underlying the cryptocurrency 
(Redshaw, 2017). Therein, Nakamoto described the new peer-to-peer distributed ledger 
he had developed as “an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead 
of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the 
need for a trusted third party” (Nakamoto, 2008, p. 1). In addition to replacing mediating 
trust networks to facilitate these cryptocurrency transactions, Nakamoto’s blockchain also 
produced a permanent, immutable record of all these transactions. While many aspects of 
Nakamoto’s blockchain technology were not exactly new, it was Nakamoto’s innovative 
use of immutable records that generated the breakthrough, providing trustless, immutable 
capabilities.   
The key to understanding Nakamoto’s innovation begins with understanding the 
main aspects that allow the Bitcoin blockchain to carry out its primary function—to 
provide a tamper-proof, reliable record of all bitcoin transactions. As Phil Champagne 
(2014) succinctly clarifies in his chapter “How and Why Bitcoin Works,” these aspects 
are: 
                                                
2 The real person or persons behind the name Satoshi Nakamoto have not yet been 
revealed. Many theories abound as to the real identity of Nakamoto, but as this is outside 
the scope of this paper, Nakamoto will be referred to throughout this paper using the 
singular male pronouns as indicated in online profiles of Nakamoto.  
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• A public ledger (called Bitcoin’s block chain). Consider this as 
essentially a giant book that is publicly available and contains the 
bookkeeping records of all transactions ever made in the Bitcoin 
system, with new pages constantly being added.   
 
• A cryptographic algorithm called asymmetric encryption used for 
authorization of the transactions.   
 
• A distributed network of computer nodes (also commonly known 
as miners) that verify and validate Bitcoin transactions and update 
the public ledger (p.10). 
Each of these three components—a public ledger, a cryptographic algorithm, and a 
distributed network of computer nodes—performs particular tasks that make the entire 
blockchain work. The Bitcoin blockchain’s public ledger is essentially a data structure. 
More specifically, as Champagne explains it is a distributed register shared by all 
members of the Blockchain network that is constantly appended, keeping a stored record 
of every bitcoin transaction (though not the actual bitcoins themselves).  
Transactions are not added individually, but in encrypted units, or “blocks,” that 
are linked or “chained” together, hence the term ‘blockchain.’ Each block contains a list 
of the most recent transactions and a hash pointer. The hash pointer forms the link to the 
next block in a long a continuous chain of hashes, thereby making it impossible to delete 
a block or insert a new one into the middle of the chain (Lemieux 2017a). Sometimes 
when chains grow too long, the chain can be compressed into a structure known as a hash 
tree or a Merkle Tree (Lemieux 2017a). A hash derived from all the previous hashes in 
the chain forms the root of the Merkle Tree, thereby maintaining the integrity of the chain 
while also saving storage space (Lemieux 2017a).  
As Champagne (2014) further explains, using asymmetric encryption, 
transactions––i.e. blocks––are verified and further validated by Bitcoin miners. Also 
referred to as public-key cryptography, asymmetric encryption is used to determine who 
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is authorized to spend the bitcoins. The encryption algorithm generates a pair of different 
digital signatures or hashes referred to as the public and private key (Champagne, 2014). 
While the public key can be easily calculated through the algorithm by the private key, it 
is impossible for the public key to determine the private key (Champagne, 2014). Thus, 
the public key serves as a visible Bitcoin address for the user, while the private key 
connected to that public key remains an encrypted hash only visible to the owner through 
his/her Bitcoin wallet, a password-protected account (Champagne, 2014). Any 
transactions—transfers of bitcoin to and from the account, current balance, etc.—related 
to the Bitcoin address constitute a public key, open to public viewing (Champagne, 
2014). The owner’s identity, however, remains private by means of the private key. 
Moreover, only the owner of the private key can access, spend, or transfer the bitcoins 
associated with the key.  
Finally, as Champagne (2014) points out it is the network of nodes or miners that 
essentially keep the Bitcoin blockchain operating. Blocks cannot be added into the chain 
without reaching network consensus. In other words, all active miners in the network 
must verify the block’s authenticity. Any time Bitcoin owners sign off on a transaction, 
the transaction is put into a pool of unconfirmed transactions (Champagne, 2014). Miners 
then generate a block of transactions by selecting transactions from these pools 
(Champagne, 2014). Approximately every ten minutes a new block is added that lists all 
the bitcoin transactions to have transpired in the last ten minutes (Champagne, 2014). In a 
process explained further below, miners race to be the one to verify the block by solving 
a cryptographic puzzle and thereby add the block to the blockchain. Every other active 
miner in the network must then validate the block, thus ensuring all miners have the most 
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current blockchain (Champagne, 2014). As the network continues to validate the 
transaction it becomes irreversible (Champagne, 2014). 
By waiting for confirmation of a payment’s receipt, miners also guard themselves 
from double spending fraud (Champagne, 2014). A double spending fraud occurs when 
someone successfully spends their money more than once, sending money and then 
reversing the transaction to return these funds back to their account (Champagne, 2014). 
One of Nakamoto’s major innovations was to use the proof-of-work protocol to ensure 
transactions become irreversible, preventing double-spending. The proof-of-work 
protocol, a computationally intensive protocol invented in 1992 by Cynthia Dwork and 
Moni Naor to deter spam and denial-of-service attacks to email accounts, works well with 
the decentralized nature of the blockchain network (Camp, 2018). In the most basic 
sense, a proof-of-work protocol issues a somewhat difficult mathematical challenge––
usually in the form of a cryptographic puzzle––to the service requester (Camp, 2018). 
The requester must solve the puzzle to obtain service (Camp, 2108). The asymmetric 
protocol must be just difficult enough to slow the requester’s computer down, but simple 
enough for the service provider to check (Camp, 2018). 
In the Bitcoin blockchain, the proof-of-work is a cryptographic puzzle in the form 
of a SHA256 hash. Each block in the chain has its own hash value or checksum, as well 
as other transactional data: a summary of the proposed transactions included in the block, 
a set of identifiers associated with the previous block, and a random variable called a 
nonce (Champagne, 2014). The nonce is a random variable assigned to a new block 
(Champagne, 2014). Miners compete with other active nodes to solve the puzzle—that is, 
miners compete to find blocks with specific nonce values that cause the block’s hash 
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value to be unusually small (Smith, 2017). Once a miner has found the right nonce value 
through what is essentially trial and error, the block can be verified. True to a proof-of-
work protocol, the verification—authenticating the block’s hash with a SHA256 
checksum—is easy (Smith, 2017). Finding the new nonce—hence the term mining—is 
computationally intensive as it requires hundreds of checksum calculations (Smith, 
2017). The first miner to solve the proof-of-work algorithm earns the bitcoins associated 
with the block. The rest of the miners validate that block by confirming it adhered to all 
the rules. Once the block is validated, miners drop whatever block they were working on 
and the entire cycle begins again (Champagne, 2014). It takes about ten minutes to 
validate a block on the Bitcoin blockchain (Champagne, 2014). 
As one might surmise, proof-of-work is inefficient and not only consumes a great 
deal of computing resources, but also electricity both to power the computers as well as 
the cooling systems required to keep those systems from overheating. An analysis of 
Bitcoin blockchain performed in May 2017 determined that at that time, it cost an 
estimated $50,000 an hour to maintain this hardware (Aste, 2016). According to the 
Digiconomist’s “Bitcoin Energy Consumption Index” (n.d.-a), Bitcoin consumes as much 
energy as the entire country of Switzerland. The electricity consumed per transaction was 
estimated at 638 KWh, the same amount of energy that could power 21.57 U.S. 
households for one day (Digiconomist, n.d.-a). While these figures relate specifically to 
Bitcoin blockchain, an older blockchain with an extensive mining community and long 
blockchain, these results are still useful for thinking comparatively about other 
blockchain projects—particularly ambitious projects aspiring to manage millions of 
records on their respective blockchains.  
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Storage is also another concern for any blockchain, as storing these large 
quantities of data could be impractical and lead to scalability issues. Blockchains are not 
to be confused with cloud storage, wherein data is stored off-site usually on servers 
controlled by a third-party. As every node must replicate the entire blockchain, the 
storage required for each node scales out linearly with the number of nodes (Smith, 
2017). As more miners join the network, enabling more transactions to take place, the 
blocks begin to reach their maximum data limit, creating a chain with full blocks—a 
phenomenon known as blockchain bloat (Buntinx, 2017). Blockchain bloat will slow 
down the transaction rate of the entire blockchain. To avoid bloat, block sizes must be 
increased in order to broadcast more transactions (Buntinx, 2017). Bigger block sizes 
lead to an increase in transaction fees per block and require nodes to use up more storage 
space (Buntinx, 2017). To stave off blockchain bloat many blockchains attempt to impose 
block size limits. If an application with many participants enabled users to save large 
quantities of data—such as files, images, documents, etc.—on the blockchain, the amount 
of storage required would soon eclipse each participating node’s available storage.  
Another problematic issue with blockchain is its claim regarding immutabilty. 
While it is true that the proof-of-work consensus model and append-only structure of 
blockchain makes it extremely hard to modify, it is not completely invulnerable to 
tampering (LearnCryptography.com, n.d.; Smith, 2017). A double-spend attack, also 
known as a 51% attack on a blockchain, would have the power to interfere with 
verification of blocks. As its name suggests, a 51% attack can occur when one entity 
controls more than half of the network’s computing power (LearnCryptography.com, 
n.d.). Because the blockchain relies upon a consensus mechanism to approve 
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transactions, if one person controlled more than half the nodes they could form and 
control an artificial consensus (LearnCryptography.com, n.d.). They could then deny 
other transactions, while approving the sale of their coins multiple times in a double-
spend attack (LearnCryptography.com, n.d.).  
Double-spend attacks are neither easy nor inexpensive to execute. For those 
reasons, they are considered to be not only extremely improbable, but easy to fend off, 
and in the unlikely event of their occurrence, ultimately incapable of causing too much 
damage. In order to gain a majority consensus of miners, an attacker would need to 
acquire a great deal of computing equipment that would have the capability to power 
more than half the nodes in the blockchain network (S., 2018). Aside from acquiring, 
maintaining, and housing that computing equipment, the attacker would need to pay for 
the electricity required to run those nodes, as well as the transaction fees incurred for 
each node per transaction (S., 2018). Moreover, in any attack only the most recent blocks 
could be altered, as blocks closer to the beginning of the chain are more secure 
(LearnCryptography.com, n.d.). This means an attacker could likely gain coins only from 
the most recent transactions, and they would also be unable to mint new coins 
(LearnCryptography.com, n.d.). For these reasons, many blockchain enthusiasts believe 
the actual double-spending damage these hypothetical attackers could perpetrate would 
be minor, and real damage would instead be in the form of a potential loss of trust for the 
blockchain (LearnCryptography.com, n.d.). As the blockchain might lose its potential 
legitimacy, the value of any associated coins might drop and other miners might abandon 
the chain entirely (LearnCryptography.com, n.d.). 
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Within the past year for example, five cryptocurrencies—Monacoin, bitcoin gold, 
zencash, verge and litecoin cash—have reported double-spend attacks (Hertig, 2018). 
These attacks have all occurred on smaller blockchains; blockchains having smaller 
networks that are easier to overcome (Hertig, 2018). The proof-of-work algorithm 
provides greater security when there are more active miners hashing and competing 
against one another. A potential attacker has much more competition, making the double-
spend attack far more difficult to execute (Hertig, 2018). Smaller blockchains usually 
provide less competition for a potential attacker, as their mining networks are not as large 
(Hertig, 2018). Moreover, attackers may then rent computing power, making it that much 
easier to amass the computing power needed to execute a highly lucrative double-spend 
attack (Hertig, 2018). Within the past year, attackers netted nearly $20 million in profits 
during those five double-spend attacks alone (Canellis, 2018). 
The five cryptocurrency blockchains that endured the attacks were, like the 
Bitcoin blockchain, public, permissionless blockchains. These blockchains are considered 
public, because anyone downloading the respective blockchain software may access the 
blockchain, join the mining network and start mining (Lemieux, 2017a). Moreover, these 
blockchains are considered permissionless, as all participants may access, read, write, and 
verify transactions without requiring special authorization or authentication (Lemieux, 
2017a). Public, permissionless blockchains also often run as decentralized systems—
operating without any overseeing central authority figure or institution, coordinated 
instead by consensus protocols (Lemieux, 2017a). 
 Blockchains may also be private and permissioned. Private blockchains, unlike 
public ones, are accessible only by invitation, made exclusively for member use 
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(Lemieux, 2017a). These permissioned blockchains require miners to possess member 
identities. Participants must have authorization and be authenticated in order to access the 
ledger. Permissioned blockchains usually must manage their member identities through 
membership services (Lemieux, 2107a). One of the key issues with private, permissioned 
blockchains is that they have a more centralized authority controlling access, 
authentication, permissions, what transactions can be written to the blockchain, and the 
method of consensus. While private blockchains are always permissioned, permissioned 
blockchains do not necessarily have to be private. As the ARCHANGEL project 
discussed below demonstrates, there are applications that would necessitate a 
permissioned blockchain that provides some limited public access.  
Ethereum is another important example of a public, permissionless blockchain. 
While both Bitcoin and Ethereum are among the most globally-recognized public 
decentralized blockchains, Ethereum differs from Bitcoin in many ways. For one thing, 
Ethereum is managed by a group—co-founder Vitalik Buterin and the Swiss non-profit 
group, the Ethereum Foundation (Ethereum Foundation, n.d.-a). Ethereum is also focused 
on doing far more with its blockchain platform than trading its cryptocurrency, ether. 
Instead, Ethereum is concentrating on its role as a blockchain application platform 
(Ethereum Foundation, n.d.-a). Currently, Ethereum serves as the underlying blockchain 
for numerous decentralized applications (DApps) and various blockchain-based projects, 
including ARCHANGEL (Ethereum Foundation, n.d.-a; Collomosse, et al., 2018). 
What makes Ethereum such a popular blockchain platform is the infrastructure it 
provides to new blockchain-based applications, which enables developers to write their 
own smart contracts. Ethereum, built in a Turing-complete language, was the first 
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blockchain built to specifically enable users to generate complex smart contracts 
(Ethereum Foundation, n.d.-c). Smart contracts are applications that directly embed the 
terms of a transaction into lines of code (Ethereum Foundation, n.d.-c). More specifically, 
the smart-contract is a type of code or algorithm that allows for doing more on a ledger 
than simply exchanging coins: the smart contract automates obligations and payments 
between agreed parties (Lemieux, 2017a). The contract to be executed––a payment on a 
particular date, given certain outcomes––is then appended to a timestamp in the 
blockchain sequence (Lemieux, 2017a). As a result, these smart contracts make it 
possible for the pre-arranged delivery of payments upon the outcome of an external 
event. Running on blockchain networks, smart contracts can be made fully or partially 
self-executing and/or self-enforcing (Lemieux, 2017a). Based on fulfillment of the terms 
of the contract, smart contracts govern which transactions are written onto the block, as 
well as the information it will contain (Lemieux, 2017a). It is important to note that 
despite its nomenclature, a smart contract is not legally binding on its own. Laws must 
exist in the non-virtual, outside world that validate the legality of a smart contract 
(Lemieux, 2017a).  
While smart contracts expand the possibilities of what blockchains can be used 
for, they may also serve as a source of vulnerability for a blockchain platform. Because 
the smart contract is essentially code added to the blockchain, a talented hacker could 
potentially hack the smart contract code and attack the blockchain. One such example, 
the DAO attack, shows how flaws in a smart contract code, and not the blockchain itself, 
could lead to security issues (Lemieux, 2017b). In May 2016, the DAO, or Decentralized 
Autonomous Organization, was introduced by members of the Ethereum blockchain as a 
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decentralized, public venture capital platform (Falkon, 2017). The DAO was actually 
written onto the blockchain in the form of a smart contract code (Falkon, 2017). 
Consequently, anyone seeking funding for a project could then present it to the 
community via the DAO platform. Anyone with DAO tokens could vote on any project 
and invest their coins. If the project eventually became profitable, those who invested in 
the project would receive rewards. On June 17, 2016 a hacker was able to find a fault 
within the smart contract code that allowed him/her to steal 3.6 million ether, or roughly 
$70 million dollars, in an instant (Falkon, 2017).  Fortunately, as this loot was held in a 
28-day holding account, Ethereum developers were able to create a hard fork and send 
the hacked funds back to the original owners (Falkon, 2017). By then however, user trust 
in the DAO was destroyed and it was subsequently delisted from cryptocurrency 
exchanges (Falkon, 2017).  
2.2 An Overview of TD Smith’s evaluation framework 
 
T. D. Smith’s evaluation framework, or blockchain litmus test, seeks to provide 
potential stakeholders the criteria necessary to assess the overall utility of a blockchain-
based project (2017). In other words, Smith’s evaluation framework helps stakeholders to 
assess whether or not a proposed blockchain-based solution can successfully produce the 
immutable records it has been designed to produce. Smith (2017) notes that as the use of 
blockchain expands beyond the use of cryptocurrency into applications such as 
recordkeeping and big data, certain fundamental concerns such as maintainability and 
scalability of storage persist. While these issues are problematic for all data management 
applications, they are better understood on more established centralized databases. 
Moreover, while blockchain affords certain advantages regarding redundancy and 
 18 
availability to an application, Smith (2017) notes blockchain also presents some major 
limitations regarding an application’s means for change and growth. 
To better evaluate these issues with regards to blockchain, Smith therefore 
developed his evaluation framework based on criteria derived from the fields of 
dependable and secure computing and archival science. Essentially, Smith’s evaluation 
framework combines aspects of the framework found in Avizienis, Laprie, Randell, and  
Landwehr’s (2004) “Basic Concepts and Taxonomy of Dependable and Secure 
Computing” with Victoria Lemieux’s more recent Archival Theoretic Evaluation 
Framework (2017b). Avizienis et al. define the attributes required for evaluating 
computer systems based on dependability and security (see Figure 1), while Lemieux’s 
framework develops a taxonomy that stems from the archival concept of trust (see Figure 
2). As a result, Smith’s framework for the evaluation of blockchain-based recordkeeping 
systems places utility at the top of the taxonomy and places three primary criteria below 
it: dependability, security and trust (See Figure 3). 
Figure 1. Attributes for dependable and secure computing. Reprinted from ‘Basic 
concepts and taxonomy of dependable and secure computing,’ by A. Avizienis, J.C. 
Laprie, Brian Randell and Carl Landwehr, 2004, IEEE transactions on dependable and 
secure computing 1, no. 1, p. 14. Copyright 2004 IEEE. Reprinted with permission.  
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Figure 2: Lemieux’s taxonomy of key archival concepts and their relationship to trust. 
Reprinted from “Blockchain and Distributed Ledgers as Trusted RecordKeeping 
Systems: An Archival Theoretic Evaluation Framework,” by V. Lemieux, 2017, IEEE 
Future Technologies Conference, p. 3. Copyright 2017 IEEE. Reprinted with permission. 
 
Figure 3: T.D. Smith’s Taxonomy of utility concepts. Reprinted from "The blockchain 
litmus test," by T.D. Smith, 2017, 2017 IEEE International Conference on Big Data, p. 
2302. Copyright 2017 IEEE. Reprinted with permission. 
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Smith’s placement of utility at the top of the taxonomy stems from his assertion 
that blockchain is in essence simply a data structure (2017). Noting that provided 
“enough investment an application using any data structure can be made secure”(2017, p. 
2301), Smith suggests that the framework is best used to consider whether blockchain 
technology actually addresses the needs of the given application. In other words, the 
more terms from the taxonomy the blockchain can address, the better and more cost-
efficient the blockchain application. For each term the blockchain application does not 
address, something else—another platform, program, system, etc.—addressing it will 
need to be provided, in turn adding more cost.  
 That being said, Smith does not proceed to parse out exact definitions of his usage 
for every term, rather explaining them more or less throughout his evaluation of the 
Bitcoin blockchain. This paper endeavors to explain each term through a combination of 
Smith’s explanations and referrals back to the original source papers by Avizienis et al. 
(2014) and Lemieux (2107b). Given that Lemieux’s work is especially relevant to the 
topic of recordkeeping and as it composes the greater bulk of Smith’s taxonomy, the 
review of Lemieux’s work is more extensive, meriting a section of its own.  
Avizienis et al. (2014) consider the dependability and security of a system from 
the perspective of system faults. Recognizing that a system can and usually does fail, 
Avizienis et al. define a system’s dependability in terms of the system’s “ability to avoid 
service failures that are more frequent and more severe than acceptable”(2014, p. 13). In 
other words, how much system failure is too much? To that end, they argue that 
dependability can be characterized by the following five attributes: availability, 
reliability, safety, integrity and maintainability. Of those listed traits, Smith retains 
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availability—the “readiness for correct service” (Avizienis et al., 2014, p. 13)—and 
maintainability—the “ability to undergo modifications and repairs” (Avizienis et al., 
2014, p. 13)—as elements of dependability.  Smith (2017) eliminates safety as an 
attribute—“the absence of catastrophic consequences on the user(s) and the environment” 
(Avizienis et al., 2014, p. 13)—arguing that the blockchain systems he analyzed had no 
physical interaction with users and thus, pose no liability of direct physical damage. 
Integrity—the “absence of improper system alterations” (2014, p. 13)—is also a 
required trait of security according to Avizienis et al. Integrity, along with availability 
and confidentiality—“the absence of unauthorized disclosure of information” (Avizienis 
et al., 2014, p. 13)—are conditions that must be met to ensure security. More specifically, 
within the context of security, availability means “the availability of authorized actions 
only” (Avizienis et al., 2014, p. 13) and integrity means the absence of unauthorized 
system alterations. Smith does include both confidentiality and integrity under the 
security branch of his taxonomy, but for reasons that will become more evident in the 
section below, he defers to Lemieux’s more nuanced understanding of integrity.  
2.3 Victoria Lemieux’s Archival Theoretic Framework 
 
Among the forefront of academics researching blockchain, Victoria Lemeiux was 
one of the first to produce an in-depth academic study of blockchain applications for 
recordkeeping. In her unpublished study, “Blockchain Technology for Record Keeping: 
Help or Hype,” Lemieux (2016a) determined that blockchain solutions for records 
management were overhyped. While she notes that there was a lot of focus on and 
subsequently great potential for blockchain to provide increased transparency, more 
privacy protections, improved efficacy, current solutions were not meeting those desired 
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goals (2016a). Lemieux argued that part of the problem had to do with the lack of critical 
studies and evaluation metrics of blockchain solutions (2016a). Without such tools how 
could one properly assess and implement blockchain solutions? In particular, Lemieux 
demonstrates this by pointing out the irony in the fact that no developers of blockchain-
based recordkeeping had actually consulted with archivists, records managers or 
academics well-versed in the archival sciences (2016a). As a result, their solutions for the 
long-term archival preservation of trustworthy records were designed with no awareness 
of archival theory or even best practices and standards for records management (2016a). 
Thus, at the time of her study, Lemieux concludes blockchain based solutions for records 
management were mainly hype and that in order to truly understand and actualize the 
potential of blockchain-based recordkeeping systems, more archival-science based 
research had to be done. 
Lemieux has subsequently published a series of articles providing more detailed 
research into the use of blockchain solutions for recordkeeping. Her studies include a 
case study of the government use of blockchain technology for the recording and 
transferring of land titles (2017c), a risk analysis of blockchain-based land-registry 
system using records management and digital preservation standards (2016b), a co-
authored study with Manu Sporny considering how to establish the archival bond in 
blockchain-based recordkeeping systems (Lemieux and Sporny, 2017), and a typology of 
blockchain records-keeping solutions currently available (2017a). From this original 
research, Lemieux has designed the evaluation metric she originally cited the need for in 
her earlier article “Blockchain Technology for Record Keeping: Help or Hype” (2016a). 
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In her paper, “Blockchain and Distributed Ledgers as Trusted Recordkeeping 
Systems: An Archival Theoretic Evaluation Framework” (2017b), Lemieux applies 
archival science to generate a preliminary framework to assess the capability of 
blockchain-based recordkeeping systems to produce trustworthy immutable records. 
More specifically, Lemieux (2017b) lays out an archival theoretic framework based upon 
the theory and principles underlying trustworthy recordkeeping, which she then uses to 
analyze a generic blockchain recordkeeping reference architecture and operating model.  
Lemieux’s framework is built upon archival science’s three criteria for 
trustworthiness: accuracy, reliability and authenticity (2017b). Pulling from archival 
sources—mainly the International Research on Permanent Authentic Records in 
Electronic Systems (InterPARES) terminology database (Pearce-Moses et al., 2017) and 
the Society of American Archivist’ glossary—Lemieux defines each criteria and its 
related attributes, further diagramming a taxonomy of these archival concepts and 
attributes in relation to trust (see figure 2 above). While these definitions provide some 
clarity regarding what constitutes trustworthiness (at least in the archival sense), Lemieux 
notes that assessments of a record’s trustworthiness are often probabilistic, as humans 
must evaluate these criteria using often incomplete and sometimes uncertain information 
regarding the record and its origins (2017b, p.2). 
Of the three criteria, accuracy is perhaps the simplest to define. Fairly similar to 
common understandings of the term, accuracy relates to how precise, correct, truthful, 
and pertinent the contents of records are, or in other words, how well the records reflects 
reality. Lemieux defines accuracy concerned with “the truth-value of the contents (facts) 
of the record” (2017b, p. 3). 
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Reliability, as the chart demonstrates, is a bit more complex as it is composed of 
three attributes: completeness at the point of creation, consistency with formal rules of 
creation, and “naturalness” (Lemieux, 2017b). Completeness at the point of creation 
speaks to the transactional aspect of a record, namely its ability to effect consequences. 
More specifically, Lemieux posits that for a record to have completeness, it must have all 
the necessary components required by the record creator and a legal-administrative 
system to enact whatever transaction the record is about (2017b, p. 3). Lemieux cites as 
an example a sale contract for land—without the requisite signatures and date, the 
contract is not complete. In archival science, therefore, completeness is considered an 
innate characteristic of a record related to its formal aspects (2017b, p.3). 
Consistency refers to the document’s consistency—or similarity—with other 
authentic documents created of similar provenance according to Lemieux (2017b). More 
specifically, the record should share the same physical and formal elements—ink from 
that time period, computer font that does not postdate the document, contemporaneous 
language and style—of other authentic records from that time period (Lemieux, 2017b). 
Naturalness refers to the nature of the record’s creation, particularly how 
deliberately the record was created (Lemieux, 2017b). Records, unlike books or other 
types of publications, are not created to disseminate knowledge as end products in and of 
themselves. Records are created more as byproducts of daily business or life processes. 
As a result, Lemieux further explains that records “possess qualities of 
unselfconsciousness that underpin their reliability as records” (2017b, p. 3).  
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The final criteria, authenticity, is the quality of the record that verifies that it is in 
fact what it claims to be and that it has not been corrupted, altered and/or falsified in any 
way (Lemieux, 2017b, p. 4). To be considered authentic then, the record must 
demonstrate that it was created by the entity represented as its creator. To that end, a 
signature—physical or digital—both identifies the creator while also validating the record 
as the product of the creator (Lemieux, 2017b). It is important to note, as Lemieux does, 
that authenticity of the record has no bearing on the truth-value of the content, as “it 
merely establishes that the purported creator of the record is genuine and that the creator 
possesses the authority to make the record” (2017b, p. 4).  Thus, it is very possible for a 
news paper article to be authentic—it can be proven that it was written by a journalist and 
approved and published by the journalist’s newspaper—yet have false content—the 
journalist did not verify their facts, was given false information, or lied.  
Further elaborating on authenticity, Lemieux (2017b) discusses identity and 
integrity—the two required preconditions for establishing authenticity. Identity refers to 
“the whole of the characteristics of a document or record that uniquely distinguish it from 
any other document or record” (Pearce-Moses, 2017). In other words, identity is the sum 
of all aspects of the document or record that establish the record to be uniquely and 
authentically itself, differentiated from other similar copies or forgeries.  
As Lemieux explains further, identity in the archival context hinges upon proving 
and maintaining the archival bond (2017b, p.4). The archival bond refers to the 
relationship a record has to the event or activity it serves to document, to other records 
documenting the same activity, and to the individual who saved it as a record (Lemieux, 
2017b, p. 4). Through the archival bond a record is connected to its “specific context of 
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creation and use” (Lemieux, 2017b, p.4) as well as to other records from the same 
archival aggregation—i.e. records that emerged from the same context. It is impossible to 
tell whether a record is genuine or forged without examining the archival bond, which in 
turn is usually ascertained through studying the record’s provenance. 
Aside from confirming the identity, the integrity of the document must be verified 
in order to establish authenticity of a record over time (Lemieux, 2017b). For a record to 
maintain its integrity means it has not been altered, corrupted, or tampered with over 
time. To ensure the integrity of a document, a system is devised to monitor and record the 
chain-of-custody of a record. In terms of digital archiving, this means a whole series of 
measures related to operation and infrastructure of recordkeeping information systems. 
As Lemieux (2017b) writes, some processes that ensure integrity include “access 
controls, user authentication and verification, audit trails, as well as documentation that 
demonstrates the normal functioning, regular maintenance, and frequency of upgrades or 
records systems” (p. 4). 
Lemieux (2017b) further notes that an important aspect of integrity is the archival 
concept of completeness after creation. This relates to both the record’s physical integrity 
and interpretability over time (Lemieux, 2017b). Within the context of digital 
preservation, this means that preserving the bit structure of data is insufficient if 
interpretability and accessibility are lost. Because bit level preservation often incurs 
semantic loss, the digital curator must also ensure that enough contextual information is 
preserved with the record in order to allow current and future users to understand and 
access it (Lemieux, 2017b). As Lemieux (2017b) explains, while one might be able to 
preserve the bit stream of a record and even the software needed to render the bitstream, 
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if the contextual information necessary to understand the record is missing, then the 
record is no longer a valid record. That is, a record that is not interpretable and/or remains 
inaccessible can no longer produce its “real world effect,” whether that was to serve as 
proof of land transfer or as a certificate of ownership or identity, etc. (Lemieux, 2017b, p. 
4-5). Therefore, digital preservation of records, as Lemieux (2017b) succinctly concludes, 
“involves preservation of the integrity of the identity of records, through preservation of 
the archival bond, in addition to preservation of the integrity of the general semantic 
context, content and form of data” (p. 5). 
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3 Methods 
This study applies the criteria found in T. D. Smith’s blockchain evaluation 
framework to two blockchain-based recordkeeping projects: ARCHANGEL and 
RecordsKeeper. Using publicly available information, each project was assessed and 
rated according how well these recordkeeping systems address the evaluation 
framework’s three primary criteria—dependability, security and trust. Ratings range from 
Low, Medium and High indicating that the criteria was not addressed at all, partially 
addressed or fully addressed, respectively (See Table 1 in Discussion section). 
Though a variety of blockchain-based platforms devoted to recordkeeping have 
emerged, the platforms chosen for this study—ARCHANGEL and RecordsKeeper—
exemplify two primary recordkeeping applications. The ARCHANGEL project 
represents one of the first attempts by an archival institution to solve a recordkeeping 
issue related to public records management by archives and memory institutions. In 
contrast, the RecordsKeeper platform is a private company’s attempt to address business 
and administrative electronic records management needs for organizations and 
individuals.  
More specifically, the ARCHANGEL project focuses on preserving the 
provenance and integrity of public digital documents curated by archives and memory 
institutions (Collomosse et al., 2018). While archives and memory institutions would 
primarily add records to the ARCHANGEL blockchain, other public users would be
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 allowed to use the platform to authenticate the integrity of public documents whose hash 
record have already been entered on the platform. The ARCHANGEL project is a 
collaboration between a trusted government archive, an academic institution, and an 
independent non-profit organization—The National Archives, London, UK, the 
University of Surrey, and the Open Data Institute, respectively (Collomosse et al, 2018).   
RecordsKeeper, on the other hand, is a private company managed by its two 
founders—blockchain developers Toshendra Sharma and Rohendra Singh—and other 
blockchain developers and experienced marketers (RecordsKeeper, n.d.-b).  
RecordsKeeper is a blockchain-based recordkeeping solution for businesses and 
individuals to use for their various electronic records management needs 
(RecordsKeeper, n.d.-c). Aside from the comparative value of these two different 
systems, at the time of this study’s writing, no previous evaluations of this type had been 
conducted on these two blockchain-based recordkeeping solutions.  
 This study used publicly available information regarding each platform to make 
the evaluations. The primary source of information for ARCHANGEL consisted of a 
four-page summary of the ARCHANGEL project written by Collomosse et al. (2018) and 
blog posts posted by project partners (Keller 2018a, 2018b). The RecordsKeeper white 
paper (RecX Technologies Limited, n.d.) and website (RecordsKeeper, n.d.-a, n.d.-b, 
n.d.-c,n n.d.-d, n.d.-e) served as primary sources regarding the RecordsKeeper platform. 
For more technical information regarding the MultiChain stream technology underlying 
the RecordsKeeper platform, this study referred to blog posts on the MultiChain website 
(Greenspan, 2018, 2016; MultiChain, n.d-a, n-d-b.).  
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 Ratings are based on the how well each platform addressed Smith’s three 
evaluation criteria: dependability, security, and trust. Each of the three criteria is further 
composed of two major traits—availability and maintainability (dependability); 
confidentiality and authenticity (security); and accuracy and reliability (trust). In order to 
determine each platform’s performance with regard to each listed trait as defined in 
Smith’s framework, this study examined each platform’s proposed use cases, intended 
participants, consensus protocol, blockchain type, technical features, and other available 
information. If a platform was able to address both traits of one criterion efficiently, then 
it earned a ‘High’ ranking for that criterion. If a platform was only able to address one 
trait or could partially address both traits, then it earned a ‘Medium’ ranking for that 
criterion. If the platform was unable to sufficiently address both traits, then it earned a 
‘Low’ ranking for that criterion.  
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4 Research Results 
4.1 ARCHANGEL Assessment 
 
 Initiated in 2017 by The National Archives (UK) in partnership with the 
University of Surrey and the Open Data Institute, ARCHANGEL is a blockchain-based 
decentralized platform focused on securing the long-term integrity of digital documents 
preserved in public archives and memory institutions (Collomosse et al., 2018). Aiming 
to guarantee trustworthiness through distributed ledger technology (DLT)—as opposed to 
institutional reputation as archival institutions currently do—ARCHANGEL 
“cryptographically guarantees the provenance, immutability and so the integrity of 
archived documents” (Collomosse, et al., 2018, p.1). ARCHANGEL seeks to record the 
digital signature, or hash, of the digital documents onto the blockchain, along with the 
relevant accompanying metadata to aid in the identification and verification of said 
documents. Thus, while the digital public documents themselves would not be preserved 
in ARCHANGEL—instead remaining under the stewardship of the archive or memory 
institution—the hash recorded on the blockchain provides a public record of the 
document’s provenance and allows one to verify the integrity of the document over long 
periods of time (Collomosse et al., 2018).  
 Collomosse et al. (2018) propose to use a permissioned blockchain, which enables 
them to designate which users are able to perform various activities on the network. As 
such, Collomosse et al. (2018) explain only approved archives and memory institutions 
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would be authorized to append the blocks to the blockchain, but the public would still be 
able to access and read the blockchain, as well as verify transactions. More specifically, 
the archivists (or approved agents) responsible for depositing documents into the archive 
or memory institution would be authorized to append the ARCHANGEL blockchain with 
the document’s content hash upon the moment of the document’s deposition into the 
archive (Collomosse et al., 2018). Likewise, these permissioned agents would be able to 
update the blockchain if any authorized changes were made to the document––i.e. 
redactions, etc.––thereby creating a transparent audit trail (Collomosse et al., 2018). By 
still enabling the blockchain to be publicly readable, moreover, the ledger remains 
transparent, allowing anyone to openly authenticate digital objects released from an 
archive at any time (Collomosse et al, 2018).  
 Using the ARCHANGEL platform, a hash of the digital document is extracted 
upon deposition of the document (Collomosse et al., 2018). A file format identification 
tool examines the binary information within the file to determine the file format 
(Collomosse et al., 2018). A content hashing algorithm is then used to extract format-
dependent hash or content hash from the document. For now, ARCHANGEL uses the 
classic binary hashing algorithm, the SHA-256 (Collomosse et al., 2018). Once the 
content hash has been generated through this process, the hash, a document global unique 
identifier (GUID), and a unique identifier representing the content hashing process, along 
with any supporting metadata provided by the archivist, will be appended in a new block 
at the end of the blockchain (Collomosse et al., 2018).  
 Though not developed yet, Collomosse et al. (2018) plan to eventually use 
algorithms (codes or models) customized to file formats in order to generate the content 
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hashes for the ARCHANGEL platform (Keller, 2018b). Once this is implemented, users 
will need to be sure that they use the same customized algorithm to generate the new 
content hash (Collomosse et al, 2018). In this case, the content hashes and algorithm 
hashes must match to accurately verify integrity. While Collomosse et al. (2018) do not 
provide a specific framework or model regarding the content of the supporting metadata, 
they do suggest including the archivist’s notes, deposition date, versioning information, 
and for customized content hashing, the algorithmic hash of the code or model used to 
extract the content hash (p. 2).  
 Having opted to implement ARCHANGEL on the Ethereum platform, 
ARCHANGEL must use the same proof-of-work protocol as Ethereum to append and 
validate transactions to the ledger (Collomosse et al., 2018). In accordance with their 
permissioned DLT model, Collomosse et al. (2018) suggest two means of consensus 
checking for ARCHANGEL. In the first method, the ledger is maintained through proof-
of-work performed among a private set of nodes sustained collectively by multiple 
archives and memory institutions, ideally from different disciplines and nations 
(Collomosse et al., 2018).  In the second method, the ledger is maintained through proof-
of-work that is performed across a public, globally-maintained blockchain, such as 
Ethereum, by miners of the public blockchain (Collomosse et al., 2018). Collomosse et 
al. (2018) explain that a smart contract granting authorization to write is used in this case 
to append data, provided that all conditions of the smart contract are met. Once the 
conditions are met, a secret key grants entry to the smart contract at its end-point 
(Collomosse et al., 2018).  
 34 
 At any point in the future, as Collomosse et al. (2018) explain, if anyone wishes to 
authenticate the provenance and integrity of a document curated or released by an archive 
or memory institution, they must rehash the content hash from the same copy of the 
document and then compare it with the original hash securely stored within the 
ARCHANGEL blockchain. In order to find the appropriate data block with the original 
content hash created upon deposition, the user may search through the publicly available 
contents using the GUID, the content hash, and the metadata (Collomosse et al., 2018). 
Once the appropriate data block has been identified, the hashes can be compared. 
According to Collomosse et al. (2018), if the hashes match, then the document’s integrity 
has been verified. If the hashes do not match, the integrity has been compromised. In 
situations where the changes were required for legitimate reasons (i.e. redacting sensitive 
information, preservation purposes, etc.), the archive will then append the ledger 
documenting those changes by recording the new content hash of the altered version 
along with information and metadata detailing who made the changes, when the changes 
were made and possibly why (Collomosse et al., 2018).  
 
Dependability 
 Availability of the ARCHANGEL blockchain depends on its ability to maintain a 
robust network of nodes to continually validate updates to the blockchain. Given that they 
have chosen to use the expensive proof-of-work protocol to establish consensus, the costs 
of maintaining a node on the ARCHANGEL blockchain seem rather cost prohibitive for 
archival institutions and/or independent scholars. Though Ethereum does not consume as 
much energy as Bitcoin, it still uses as much energy per year as the entire country of 
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Angola (Digiconomist, n.d.-b). One transaction—recall multiple transactions fit into one 
block—requires an estimated 40 KWh or enough to power 1.35 U.S. households per day 
(Digiconomist, n.d.-b). At an average price of $0.10 per KWh, one transaction could cost 
up to $4.00 to maintain.  
 The National Archive, which holds records from the last 1000 years, 5% of which 
have been digitized, could produce millions of transactions alone, just by seeking to make 
hash records of their digital documents (The National Archives, n.d.-b). A quick search 
of three of the online collections out of 66—the Royal Navy ratings’ service records 1853 
(700,000 records), the Royal Marines service records (~110,000 record), and the British 
Army Medical index cards 1914-1920 (5 million records)—yields 5,810,000 records (The 
National Archives, n.d.-a, n.d.-c, n.d.-d, n.d.-e). This does not include records from the 
UK Government Web Archive, which includes a Video Archive (at least 10,000 videos), 
Twitter Archive (at least 100,000 posts), and approximately 500,000 archived websites 
(U.K. Government Web Archive, n.d.-a, n.d.-b, n.d.-c). This simple estimate of records 
alone generates 6,420,000 hash records to be transacted and stored on ARCHANGEL’s 
blockchain. At a cost of $4.00 per transaction paid strictly for energy consumption—not 
including transaction fees, cost of computing, or other associated expenses—this can add 
up fast.  
 The costs would continue to rise for other archives and memory institutions––
particularly national archives joining ARCHANGEL––which would likely desire the 
addition of thousands of their own records to the blockchain. As these transactions 
become more blocks added to the chain, a robust network of miners will be needed to 
handle all the transactions. In the first proposed method, the archives and memory 
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institutions involved in project ARCHANGEL would provide private nodes that perform 
the proof-of-work verifying transactions appending blocks to the blockchain. In order to 
maintain a node on the network, archives and memory institutions that join will need to 
be well-resourced in terms of adequate computing hardware, funding to pay for 
electricity, adequate cooling systems for their mining equipment, and technically 
proficient staff. It is unclear, moreover, whether one node is sufficient for an archive or 
memory institution to join the blockchain, or if a minimum number of nodes are required 
to join. While some archives and memory institutions might be interested in 
ARCHANGEL for its ability to increase public trust in their records and practices, 
generally speaking, memory institutions are often underfunded and understaffed.3 In his 
blog post critiquing the ARCHANGEL project, David S. H. Rosenthal also notes 
Collomosse et al.’s disconnect with the pragmatic realities of most archival institutions, 
writing that: 
 These institutions are under severe budget pressure and competition  
 for skilled staff. They are being forced to outsource their IT operations  
 to “the cloud,” and are unlikely to take on new or maintain existing  
 in-house tasks. (2018)  
 
Given how few memory institutions do not face the above-mentioned constraints, it is 
very difficult to imagine how ARCHANGEL will be able to recruit enough institutions to 
maintain sufficient active nodes to sustain the ARCHANGEL blockchain. 
 The second method whereby public miners perform the necessary proof-of-work 
to maintain the ARCHANGEL ledger requires more incentive to ensure a robust network. 
                                                
3 This was the dominant motif amongst participants at a stakeholder workshop held for the ARCHANGEL 
platform. The participants—13 experts from a variety of AMIs dealing with public documents—were 
instructed about the ARCHANGEL project and given time to interact with platform prototype for an hour 
in a lab-based setting at the University of Surrey. (Collomosse et al, 2018, p. 3).  
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At this time, there does not seem to be any incentive, such as earning cryptocurrency 
tokens or assets of any kind, for miners to mine. Collomosse et al. (2018) have mentioned 
that ARCHANGEL is still exploring potential business models to encourage 
sustainability, including the idea of having users seeking to verify public documents 
contribute mining effort as payment for the service (Collomosse et al., 2018; Keller, 
2018b). This would require expanding smart contracts to enable search and verification 
of the content of the block in addition to the current write function (Collomosse et al., 
2018; Keller, 2018b). It does not seem likely that there is enough market demand to pay 
for the authentication of public documents, at least, not enough to sustain the entire 
blockchain. As Rosenthal (2018) is quick to point out, moreover, scholars using such 
documents are not very likely to pay for such services.  
 Given its expense and the fact that permissioned blockchains do not require proof-
of-work to maintain consensus, it is surprising ARCHANGEL has opted to use proof-of-
work. In fact, other less expensive consensus models can be used, such as proof-of-stake 
or Byzantine Fault Tolerance protocols (Rosenthal, 2018). A proof-of-stake protocol is an 
algorithm for validating transactions that, unlike proof-of-work, determines the creator of 
the next block through a formula based on random selection and their stake, or how much 
coin they own in the blockchain (Blockgeeks, 2018). Nodes are not called miners, but 
forgers, as they no longer compete to acquire the next block (Blockgeeks, 2018). Forgers 
also do not get block rewards, but instead win the transaction fees associated with the 
block (Blockgeeks, 2018).  
 Implemented by IBM’s permissioned blockchain Hyperledger, a Byzantine Fault 
Tolerance protocol is designed to resist faults or attacks so long as two-thirds of the 
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nodes are honest nodes (Hyperledger, 2018).. This generally works well in a 
permissioned ledger as participants have legal, business, or some other goal-oriented 
incentive to remain honest actors (Hyperledger, 2018). The Byzantine Fault Tolerance 
protocol is also easier and more efficient to implement in a network with a lower number 
of nodes (Hyperledger, 2018). In his blog, Rosenthal (2018) argues that ARCHANGEL’s 
first model for consensus based upon a permissioned ledger of only memory institutions 
would be much better implemented on Hyperledger where the Byzantine Fault Tolerance 
protocol would provide a much more efficient and inexpensive consensus protocol. 
Availability also hinges upon the participating memory institutions and archives 
responsible for off-site storage of the actual documents. ARCHANGEL relies upon the 
archives and memory institutions to preserve the actual records correlating with the 
content hashes being preserved on its blockchain. Preserving a content hash means very 
little if the document the hash is meant to refer to is not available. Should the repository 
fail to preserve these documents for whatever reason—i.e. error, malware attacks, 
damage to the physical hardware, etc.—or if the repository chooses to quit the project, 
then these documents would no longer be available to the system. This would constitute a 
system failure. Thus, system availability also depends upon the sustained preservation of 
these documents in the off-chain archives and institutional repositories. 
 In terms of maintenance, the platform interface will likely require upgrades as 
they continue to develop the platform and its functionality. A recent blog post by the 
Open Data Institute’s J. R. Keller (2018b) announced plans to develop the 
ARCHANGEL user interface in order to make it easier for both the archival institutions 
and public citizens to use for their varying purposes. Some future plans also include 
 39 
creating more specialized hashing for particular file formats—i.e. PDF files, image files, 
video files, etc. (Keller, 2018b).  
It is unclear if the new hashing algorithms will be applied retrospectively to 
documents that have already been entered onto the blockchain initially with the binary 
SHA-256 algorithm. If so, a central question becomes how those changes will be 
reflected in the ARCHANGEL platform, given that blockchains are an append-only 
structure. In other words, how does ARCHANGEL reflect any changes to records entered 
into the system? Does it produce an audit trail to reflect changes made to the public 
record, either in terms of applying a new content-specific hash via the ARCHANGEL 
platform, or in the more common instance of an archivist making necessary updates (i.e. 
redactions, format changes for system migration, etc.) to the record held in the 
repository? Will users be able to use the GUID to connect all transactions regarding a 
particular record on the blockchain, or will a new GUID be issued for every single 
transaction involving the same document? Brief mention was made about adopting W3C 
PROV standards for document versioning, but it is again not clear exactly how that 
would be integrated into the system. While no clear answers to these questions have been 
provided in Collomosse et al.’s paper (2018), it is fair to assume that someone will be in 
charge of maintaining aspects of the platform such as the interface, permissions or 
memberships, should membership fees be charged. It is not clear who would do this 
maintenance work and how they would get paid. 
Given the cost-prohibitive, inefficient, and basically unnecessary use of proof-of-
work consensus protocols it seems highly unlikely ARCHANGEL will attract enough 
archives or memory institutions to sustain the network. Similarly, without any incentive 
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for public miners to mine for blocks, it seems unlikely that they will attract other miners 
to support their network. Reliance on off-chain storage of documents in repositories can 
negatively impact availability as well. With regards to maintainability, very little 
information regarding how changes to document hash records has been mentioned. 
Without much of a financial plan it is also difficult to understand who will continue to 
maintain the entire ARCHANGEL platform in the near future or over time. As such, 
ARCHANGEL earns a low rating for dependability as neither availability nor 
maintainability has been sufficiently addressed. 
 
Security   
Confidentiality of user identities is maintained through the public-private key 
protocol of blockchain. This works well when the mining network is composed of various 
miners on a public blockchain. In the case of the private, permissioned blockchain 
constituted of archives and memory institutions however, it does not. Generally, in 
permissioned blockchains participant identity is not private, as all participants would 
need to be identified just to attain membership and permissions. Moreover, given that 
archives and memory institutions would be the only entities that can append records to 
the blockchain—and would be doing so in high volume and frequency—it seems that 
their user identity would be easy to uncover. Indeed, it would be desirable to know who 
adds the digital signature for a document, as this demonstrates the provenance of the hash 
record. The entity adding the record should be the institution that actually holds the 
document. Otherwise, a malicious actor could falsify a hash record. Moreover, being 
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publicly identifiable increases the transparency of the institution’s practices, further 
enhancing the trust in record.  
While transparency of user identity is likely not an issue, given that this is a 
permissioned blockchain, it is imperative that the authorizations—whatever protocols and 
mechanisms are given to the archives and memory institutions to authorize them to add 
content data to the chain—remain confidential. Currently, it is unclear what mechanisms 
and protocols would be used to authorize archives and memory institutions to commit 
blocks to the chain in the permissioned model. If using smart contracts, the code is public 
so care must be taken to ensure that the smart contract reveals nothing that bad actors 
could exploit.  
The transaction information recorded in each block is meant to be publicly 
viewable and thus, no private or sensitive information should be included in these blocks. 
This would follow similar protocols archivists follow in the creation of finding aids for 
their records. The actual public records themselves are held off-chain within the archives, 
so access to them would be handled through the archive. For public records that cannot 
be publicly released until after a certain time period (i.e. classified documents), 
ARCHANGEL could be used to provide a transparent record of the provenance while 
keeping said documents confidential. Because the document’s hash could be checked 
upon its eventual release to the public, its integrity could be verified.  
Identity of the content hash records stored on the blockchain is essentially 
predicated on the included document GUID, metadata, and transaction information. The 
document GUID represents the document from which the content hash was derived, 
thereby linking the document with the content hash in the system. The metadata might 
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also provide a way of linking the content hash to its document. The block transaction 
information can provide information regarding the memory institution that submitted the 
hash record to the blockchain. However, as accuracy of records cannot be guaranteed—
the wrong GUID or wrong metadata might have been entered—neither identity in this 
case. No apparent means of preserving the archival bond are available.  
Aside from being cost-prohibitive, the proof-of-work consensus protocol adopted 
by the ARCHANGEL project, despite all the hype, is not tamper-proof. As mentioned 
above, 51% or double-spend attacks are becoming more prevalent, particularly for newly 
forming blockchains like ARCHANGEL with smaller networks. Of the two proposed 
methods for building consensus, the permissioned network of authorized archives and 
memory institutions would probably be more secure than the network of miners on a 
public, globally maintained blockchain. In the first method, only permissioned archives 
and memory would be allowed to join and append records. The membership process 
would likely weed out bad actors. Moreover, one would assume that the institutions 
joining would have some stake in ensuring system integrity is maintained. Tampering 
with the blockchain would cast doubt on the records of their own institutions and records. 
Collomosse et al. (2018) also argue that incorporating diverse archives (government, 
university, etc.) from various nations operating independently under their own suitable 
governance structures would provide a further check against collusion, as coordinating 
such an attack against diverse actors would require immense effort (p.3).  
The latter mode of using smart contracts and public blockchain with a large 
network of independent miners can be exploited in two ways. The first is by hacking or 
exploiting a loophole in the smart contract code as was exemplified by the DAO contract 
 43 
exploits mentioned earlier. The second remains, of course, through 51% attacks. 
Collomosse et al. (2018) mistakenly suggest that proof-of-work consensus on such a 
well-established public blockchain like Ethereum is tamper proof because the network of 
nodes is so large and diverse that collusion is difficult to arrange. Though the recent 
successful spate of 51% attacks have been on blockchains with networks much smaller in 
size than Ethereum, the fact of the matter is that Ethereum has suffered double-spend 
attacks in the past (Smith, 2017). Fortunately, Ethereum’s infrastructure was strong 
enough that the attack was countered in time with hard forks (Smith, 2017). Even so, as 
Rosenthal (2018) notes, most of the large public blockchains have mining pools—
collectives of nodes—that do not operate independently. Ethereum has multiple mining 
pools, with the largest 3 pools—ethpool/ethermine (24.7%), f2pool (21.6%), and 
dwarfpool (13.3%)–controlling about 60% of the hashrate (Tuwiner, 2018). Thus, proof-
of-work, particularly in this instance, is not a guarantee of tamper-proof blockchain 
records at all.  
While much importance is given to securing the immutability of transactions in a 
block, the integrity of the entire blockchain relies upon its replication in multiple nodes 
(Lemieux, 2017a, Rosenthal, 2018). Each node is technically supposed to be carrying a 
full copy of the digital ledger as it continues to validate transactions. As Lemieux (2017a) 
notes, the tricky thing with a blockchain of hashes is that multiple copies of the entire 
ledger MUST exist in at least 2 nodes, though hopefully more. As Lemieux explains, “If 
only one full node survived, however, it would be impossible to determine whether that 
node had been tampered with, since the integrity of the node is dependent upon matching 
its copy of the ledger with other surviving copies of the ledger” (Lemieux, 2017a). In 
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other words, the entire notion of the decentralized ledger works, assuming that if one of 
the nodes fails and thus, does not retain a full copy of the ledger, the many other nodes in 
the system will have full copies. Because there is no guarantee that every node will 
contain a full copy of the digital ledger, the more nodes in the system, the greater the 
probability that multiple full copies of the ledger survive (Lemieux, 2017a). 
 Another potential risk to the physical integrity of records is the storage of the 
actual public records off-chain in their respective repositories. As Smith (2017) notes, 
“Attacking the blockchain directly is computationally difficult but any application that 
uses ‘off-chain’ resources runs the risk of lost data or value to malware or storage failure” 
(p. 5). Archives and memory institutions have the advantage of being singularly focused 
upon the preservation of their records. This means they have at least some level of 
archival infrastructure—trained archivists and/or records managers, practices, equipment, 
etc.—in place to preserve their records according to the best possible standards. 
Nevertheless, these institutions are not invulnerable to accidental loss or malicious 
damage of records.  
 In the end, the hashes stored on the blockchain hold very little meaning if the 
original documents they were to be compared to are not also preserved. Any lack of 
preservation would negatively impact completeness after creation. In terms of the 
interpretability of records, the GUID and metadata provide the information and context 
necessary to connect the content hash to its related public document. Providing the 
content hashing algorithm would further provide information necessary to accurately 
verify the content hash, once ARCHANGEL is modified to utilize more customized 
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hashing algorithms for documents. However, if the document the content hash refers to is 
not available, then the hash record loses any real world effect.  
   Confidentiality is not particularly relevant in the permissioned blockchain model, 
and available in terms of public-private key identity encryption for the public blockchain 
model ARCHANGEL proposed. Document confidentiality is managed by the archival 
and memory institutions, so again not under the purview of ARCHANGEL. Authenticity 
is difficult to guarantee in ARCHANGEL, as there is no means to provide the archival 
bond. Moreover, ARCHANGEL’s proof-of-work consensus model does not guarantee 
the physical integrity of its records. Finally, off-chain storage of the documents in 
separate repositories increases risk to the physical integrity of those documents, which in 
turn does not allow for completeness after creation. ARCHANGEL therefore earns a low 
rating for security.  
 
Trust 
 Accuracy and reliability are always difficult to manage in blockchain systems. 
Even though ARCHANGEL proposes a permissioned model, wherein only records 
professionals would be entering the hash data, there is still a chance that a record might 
have inaccurate data. In particular, the archivist might make a mistake in the metadata 
fields of the hash record, entering a typographical error, inaccurate information or 
incomplete information. Similarly, it is unclear from the ARCHANGEL documentation 
how the document GUID will be determined and if its inclusion in the record is 
automated or not. Nevertheless, a failure in either producing truly unique document 
GUID or in ensuring that the accurate document GUID is included in the hash record 
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would also produce inaccurate records. These inaccuracies would certainly negatively 
affect a future user’s ability to search and/or identify hash records for particular public 
documents.  
 The use of smart contracts can also produce inaccuracies with records. As 
Lemieux (2017b) points out there is always the possibility of incongruity between what 
the smart contract code was intended to do and what is actually executed. The DAO 
exploit was in fact a matter of a loophole that was exploited by hackers. It is possible that 
if not tested and proofed enough a smart contract might yield unintended results through 
loopholes in the code.  
 Reliability is out of the scope of ARCHANGEL since the content hash records 
alone cannot prove the authenticity of the records they were derived from. Rather, these 
hash records will need to be compared to another content hash of the same record at a 
future date to verify the authenticity and accuracy of the document.  
 As both accuracy and reliability cannot be guaranteed by ARCHANGEL, the 
platform earns a low ranking for trust.  
4.2 RecordsKeeper Assessment 
 
 With the stated vision to “create a global open ecosystem for data sharing and 
verification,” RecordsKeeper promises to provide users the ability to store and verify 
records of any data object through their platform (RecX Technologies Limited, n.d., p. 5). 
Unlike ARCHANGEL, RecordsKeeper, founded in November 2016 by Toshendra 
Sharma and Rohendra Singh, is a private company seeking to serve the recordkeeping 
needs of organizations and individuals (RecordKeeper, n.d.-b; RecX Technologies 
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Limited, n.d.).4 RecordsKeeper seems mostly to be oriented towards businesses, as is 
evident in their suggested use cases for the platform: insurance record, health record 
manifests in judicial proceedings, enterprise know your customer (KYC) needs, 
employee verification, corporate compliances, land ownership records, government 
regulations, trustless file sharing, verifying academic certifications, and supply-chain 
management (RecordsKeeper, n.d.-e; RecX Technologies Limited, n.d., pp. 16-21).  
Built upon MultiChain technology, the RecordsKeeper platform is meant to 
operate as an open-source, immutable public global database enabling users to store both 
the hashes of the records as well as the records themselves (RecordsKeeper, n.d.-c). The 
RecordsKeeper platform, moreover, promises out-of-the-box functionality, thereby 
allowing users to seamlessly integrate the platform into their recordkeeping workflows 
(RecordsKeeper, n.d.-c). 
There are essentially four main aspects to the RecordKeeper platform: network 
nodes, JSON-RPC APIs, MultiChain streams, and the RecordsKeeper blockchain. In 
order to use RecordsKeeper each user—be it an individual or organization—must first set 
up a RecordsKeeper private node (RecordsKeeper, n.d.-c). Once the RecordsKeeper node 
is set up on the user’s local or cloud infrastructure, the user can also then set up a 
RecordsKeeper XRK Light Wallet (RecordsKeeper, n.d.-c).. Through the Light Wallet, 
users obtain XRK tokens, RecordKeeper’s own cryptocurrency, which must be used to 
pay for blockchain transaction fees (RecordsKeeper, n.d.-c; RecX Technologies Limited, 
n.d., p. 7). Users can also generate, store, and receive records from the RecordsKeeper 
blockchain using the Light Wallet (RecX Technologies Limited, n.d., p. 14).  
                                                
4 RecordsKeeper is according to the company’s website and documentation a registered limited company 
by the name of “RecX Technologies Limited” in Gibraltar, based in Singapore with offices in India 
(RecordKeeper, n.d.-b; RecX Technologies Limited, n.d.)   
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After the RecordsKeeper node is set up on the user’s computing infrastructure, the 
user can synchronize existing applications with the node and publish records on the 
RecordsKeeper Blockchain (RecordsKeeper, n.d.-c). The JSON-RPC APIs provided by 
the RecordsKeeper platform enable the existing applications on the user’s node to issue 
notifications and calls to the rest of the RecordsKeeper platform, ensuring integration of 
the user’s system with the RecordsKeeper (Morely, n.d.). Moreover, RecordsKeeper 
provides a wide array of APIs and open-source libraries to allow users to implement this 
seamless integration in various ways, including programming, websites, backend 
services, servers and mobile and desktop applications (RecX Technologies Limited, n.d., 
p.7). 
To upload and publish records on the blockchain, the user must first acquire XRK 
tokens either through mining or purchase via fiat money (RecX Technologies Limited, 
n.d., p.7). The user then uploads their record (or data) in key-value pair format into the 
RecordsKeeper blockchain, paying the required 0.1XRK per KB upload fee. Only one 
key-value pair can be added at a time, though the same key may be used several times 
with different values—i.e. records/data (RecX Technologies Limited, n.d., p.7). The 
record key is used for retrieval and verification of the record later (RecX Technologies 
Limited, n.d., p.7). Once a miner confirms the transaction, the new block is added to the 
chain. The miner earns the XRK transaction fees as a block reward for mining (RecX 
Technologies Limited, n.d., p.7). After the record is published on the RecordsKeeper 
blockchain, it may be viewed and verified by authorized parties with whom the user has 
shared the record key or transaction ID (RecX Technologies Limited, n.d., p.7). 
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RecordsKeeper strongly discourages its users from uploading an actual file or 
record in its native format. Rather, they suggest using formats ranging from JSON, XML, 
Hex, Objects, or simple text (RecordsKeeper, n.d-a). Noting that files often contain a lot 
of unnecessary raw data that will increase the size of the transaction and its cost, 
RecordsKeeper suggests all files be rendered in these simpler formats (RecordsKeeper, 
n.d-a). For files larger than 5GB, RecordsKeeper recommends only uploading the 
record’s hash (RecordsKeeper, n.d-a). Thus, not all records archived in the 
RecordsKeeper platform can be saved in their original format, unless their original format 
is one of the ones listed above. Depending on the use case, this may or may not be 
problematic. For example, if part of the records requires an image, the file will have to be 
converted to binary hexadecimal format first. In this case, the original record is not being 
stored by the RecordsKeeper system at all, but in an off-chain, off-system storage system.  
Within the RecordsKeeper system, the transaction information, document hashes 
and other metadata regarding the uploaded record are saved on the blockchain, while the 
record is usually not. Instead, the record/data is moved to off-chain storage in the 
encrypted storage layer (RecX Technologies Limited, n.d., p.7). Built upon MultiChain 
technology, RecordsKeeper uses an abstraction layer—MultiChain streams—to provide 
secure, queryable, offchain, key-value data storage that sits on top of the RecordsKeeper 
blockchain (RecX Technologies Limited, n.d., p.7). Thus, while the blockchain is 
primarily used to support timestamping, notarization, and immutability, the Multichain 
streams enable the RecordsKeeper platform to perform as a database for storing records 
as well (MultiChain, n.d.-a). 
 50 
Each stream functions as a separate append-only ordered list of items. The 
RecordsKeeper blockchain may have an unlimited number of streams. The data published 
on each stream is further archived by every node in the RecordKeeper network. By 
electing to subscribe to a stream, the node can then index the stream’s contents to allow 
efficient data retrieval (MultiChain, n.d.-a). 
Streams are generated individually on the blockchain through a distinct 
transaction that can only be signed by addresses that have been granted create 
permissions (MultiChain, n.d.-a). Stream creators automatically gain administrative, 
activation and write permissions for the streams they author. Moreover, no more than one 
stream can be created per transaction (MultiChain, n.d.-a).  
Each stream item is also represented by a blockchain transaction that publishes 
the item to the stream (MultiChain, n.d.-a). Only one item can be added to a particular 
stream at a time (MultiChain, n.d.-a). Depending on whether or not the stream is created 
as an open stream or a closed one, publishing items to a stream may or may not require 
write permissions (MultiChain, n.d.-a). Open streams allow any address that has 
permission to send blockchain transactions to publish items in the stream (MultiChain, 
n.d.-a). A closed stream, on the other hand, requires that the stream item publisher must 
have write permission in order to validate the item and the transaction (MultiChain, n.d.-
a). A closed stream will require one or more administrators who are able to manage and 
change write permissions as needed over time (MultiChain, n.d.-a). 
Each item in the stream has four basic features: data, publisher(s), a record key, 
and block transaction information (MultiChain, n.d.-a). The data is the record––or 
whatever data––the user wishes to save in the RecordsKeeper database (MultiChain, n.d.-
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a). This data may range in size from small bits of text to multiple megabytes of raw 
binary data. Each item must also be signed by one or more publishers (MultiChain, n.d.-
a). The item also includes a record key (a number between 0 and 256 bytes in length) to 
aid in future retrieval of the item (MultiChain, n.d.-a). Lastly, transaction and block 
information—i.e. transaction identification number (transaction ID), timestamp, and 
blockhash—is taken from the header of the block in which the item is confirmed 
(MultiChain, n.d.-a). 
MultiChain streams can be referenced through their transaction ID, streamref, or 
if available, a stream name (MultiChain, n.d.-a). The streamref encodes a combination of 
transaction information, specifically the block number, byte offset of the stream creation 
transaction and the first two bytes of the transaction ID (MultiChain, n.d.-a). Stream 
names are optional and must be selected at the time the stream is created. Special care 
must be taken that the stream name is unique on the blockchain—that it is not the same as 
any other stream or asset already on the blockchain (MultiChain, n.d.-a). Stream names 
are stored as UTF-8 encoded strings, case insensitive and go up to 32 bytes (MultiChain, 
n.d.-a). 
 
Dependability 
RecordsKeeper depends upon miners to validate its transactions. As it is still a 
new platform developing its network of miners, RecordsKeeper currently provides a 
permission-based consensus scheme with plans to shift to a proof-of-work consensus 
protocol once its network of miners is large and diverse enough to theoretically stave off 
a 51% attack (RecX Technologies Limited., n.d., p. 9, 12). In a permission-based 
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consensus scheme, only nodes that have been given mining permissions may participate 
in the consensus algorithm, while only the select nodes that have administrative (admin) 
permissions can add or delete all other permissions, including mining. In order to 
maintain the sense of a decentralized ledger that is not controlled by any one entity, the 
blockchain is set up so that no single administrator may change such important 
permissions as mining. Instead, a certain percentage of the administrators pre-defined in 
the blockchain parameters must agree to a permissions modification. Ideally, there would 
be multiple administrators from different organizations––i.e. multiple nodes––to make 
this work properly (MultiChain, n.d.-b). 
RecordsKeeper will manage consensus through their permission-based consensus 
scheme until block number 4,204,800 in the blockchain (RecX Technologies Limited., 
n.d., p. 10, 12). After block 4,204,800 is verified, mining permissions will be granted to 
every node in the network and RecordsKeeper will move to adopt an open proof-of-work 
consensus model (RecX Technologies Limited., n.d., p. 10, 12).   
RecordsKeeper relies upon their native XRK utility tokens to sustain and maintain 
their miner network regardless of the consensus model. Their primary token economy 
would revolve around users paying upload transaction fees using XRK tokens, which in 
turn are delivered to the miners who mine the block (RecX Technologies Limited., n.d., 
p. 15). RecordsKeeper further plans to reward users—both miners and initial adopters—
XRK tokens periodically throughout the year. Businesses that are early adopters will also 
be granted advance permissions and other rewards (RecX Technologies Limited., n.d., p. 
15).  
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While cryptocurrency rewards for mining and for early adoption may work to 
draw users into joining the new platform, it is unclear whether or not it will draw in and 
retain enough miners. One of the issues with XRK tokens is that they are utility tokens, as 
opposed to the more traditional cryptocurrency like bitcoin. Utility tokens are used for 
paying for the services provided by the company and thus, largely only have value within 
that platform or company (Camacho, n.d.). In other words, the XRK token can only buy 
services within the RecordsKeeper platform. Utility tokens can, however, increase in 
value through speculation in crypto exchanges—markets where people can buy and sell 
utility tokens (Camacho, n.d.). Namely, if an investor feels that a token like XRK will be 
valuable to many users (based on their confidence in the platform or project it supports), 
they can try to buy up many XRK tokens at a lower valuation and then try to sell them 
once their value increases (as their demand increases). While it is not possible to predict 
the future valuation of XRK tokens with absolute certainty, it would seem from the recent 
cancellation of the XRK token sale that the XRK is struggling to appeal to the 
cryptocurrency market (Sharma, 2018). In his cancellation announcement, 
RecordsKeeper co-founder Sharma (2018) cites poor marketing on their part, a recent 
overall drop of 80-90% in the cryptocurrency markets, and the recent spate of 
cryptocurrency scams as issues preventing the XRK from attracting miners. 
Aside from this type of speculation, the only other major source of demand for the 
XRK token would be from users of the actual RecordsKeeper platform. Because the XRK 
tokens can be used to pay for record keeping services on the platform, the XRK still has 
some value for those platform users. Mining for tokens would, therefore, be a worthwhile 
incentive for these users. Thus, availability would be contingent primarily upon users that 
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actually use the RecordsKeeper platform for recordkeeping functions. As it is a relatively 
new platform, having just opened up record keeping functions in April 2018, it is difficult 
to discern whether the low numbers—a total of 279 records and 93 active miners—are 
typical of a new start up or forecast an unsuccessful road ahead (RecordsKeeper, n.d.e; 
RecX Technologies Limited., n.d., p. 24). While RecordsKeeper continues to operate 
using a permission-based consensus model, the smaller network of nodes might be 
enough to sustain the platform for a while. However, once a shift to a proof-of-work 
protocol is instituted, it seems likely Recordskeeper will require a larger network of 
nodes to sustain the blockchain and fend off 51% attacks.  
As more businesses and nodes are added to their network, scalability might also 
become an issue in terms of availability and maintenance for RecordsKeeper. Given that 
each user will have multiple records and related transactions to store on the platform, 
storage might become an issue. Assuming that all users comply and store all records off-
chain via MultiChain streams, the fact remains that along with the blockchain, every 
stream item belonging to the blockchain is stored by every node in the network as well.  
Using a binary format and LevelDB index, each node stores all the off-chain data in a 
special directory of the blockchain directory (Greenspan, 2018). A node will further 
generate a separate subdirectory of the items of each stream it is subscribed to and that it 
has created (Greenspan, 2018). Within the subdirectory the relevant stream data is 
duplicated once more. While retrieval time is greatly reduced by use of MultiChain 
streams, and the blockchain itself remains smaller by storing the records off-chain, it is 
unclear whether this distributed storage capacity of network nodes will successfully store 
the blockchain and all of the off-chain records archived by users of the network.  
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To more fully support the open source community, RecordsKeeper will also offer 
developers at large a fixed amount of XRK tokens for any code developed that improves 
the security, functionality, or design features of the Recordskeeper platform. Developers 
will be able to fork the codebase to make changes and upon developing, updating and 
testing a successful code improvement, also make a merge request (RecX Technologies 
Limited, n.d., p.15). If the request is approved, the developer will be rewarded with 
tokens. This small measure may improve the overall maintainability of the blockchain 
(RecX Technologies Limited, n.d., p.15).  
RecordsKeeper relies upon the recordkeeping services of their platform and their 
XRK token to attract miners to their network. Unfortunately, as a utility token, XRK 
tokens are only useful to those using the token to pay for services within the 
RecordsKeeper platform. For miners not interested in using the RecordsKeeper platform 
for recordkeeping, XRK tokens may not hold much incentive to mine. There is no 
indication that the tokens will gain in value, or that even if they do, they will stabilize in 
value. Should RecordsKeeper shift to a proof-of-work model, they will need to build an 
even larger network of nodes. With regards to maintainability, it is unclear how 
RecordsKeeper would manage storage, as every node in the system saves all stream items 
in addition to the blockchain. This would be particularly problematic should 
RecordsKeeper expand to include many businesses and corporate clients storing 
thousands and thousands of records to the system each. RecordsKeeper provides no 
contingency plan in case their blockchain and stream data becomes too large for a node to 
store. As such, RecordsKeeper earns a low rating for dependability as neither availability 
nor maintainability has been sufficiently addressed by the system.  
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Security 
 In terms of confidentiality, data that is published on a MultiChain stream is not 
private unless it is first encrypted. Given that a stream’s data is saved on every node in 
the network, effective read permissions for streams are not possible as the node could 
read the data through its disk drive. This might give records managers some pause, 
particularly those dealing with sensitive information, such as health records, social 
security numbers, banking information, etc. While RecordsKeeper provides two options 
for encryption of files below, the fact remains that RecordsKeeper does not automatically 
encrypt files for the user. Rather, users must do this encryption themselves. Ensuring 
encryption occurs with every upload would likely require an automatic aspect in their 
records management workflow. However, as mistakes may occur and Recordskeeper is a 
digital, append-only ledger, should a user accidentally forget to encrypt their files and 
still upload them to the RecordsKeeper blockchain, those files will become accessible 
even to those who have not subscribed to the stream.  
 Therefore, any sensitive or private data must be encrypted. RecordsKeeper 
enables two forms of encryption. In the first, users can encrypt their data through their 
own application layer prior to publication. Decryption keys are then shared with other 
authorized users. It is important to note that RecordsKeeper does not automatically 
encrypt records for users. Thus, the user must make sure that their application layer and 
workflow enables and ensures encryption of data.  
 The second method, which RecordsKeeper advocates for certain cases, is to use 
symmetric cryptography and a combination of three streams. The first stream distributes 
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the public-key for participating, permissioned users in the public cryptography scheme 
(Greenspan, 2016). The second stream publishes the segments of data, all of which are 
encrypted with a unique key via symmetric cryptography (Geenspan, 2016). Finally, the 
third stream enables data access to participating permissioned users (Greenspan, 2016). 
For each segment of data that a participant is permitted to see, a stream entry is generated 
containing the data’s secret key, which in turn is encrypted with the user’s public key 
(Greenspan, 2016). This method ensures that only authorized users may see the archived 
data on the blockchain (Greenspan, 2016). 
 For records managers dealing with sensitive information—i.e. health records, 
social security numbers, banking information—the fact that all record information stored 
in the stream would be accessible to every node through the node’s disk drive might be 
cause for alarm.   
In terms of the physical integrity of the transaction data, record hashes, and 
metadata stored on the blockchain, neither the permission-based consensus scheme nor 
the proof-of-work algorithm RecordsKeeper hopes to eventually adopt provide 
guaranteed immutability. In the permission-based consensus scheme, RecordsKeeper also 
employs mining diversity parameters to ensure no one can launch a 51% attack. Mining 
diversity parameters limit miners from overpowering the network or manipulating 
transaction data by prohibiting miners from mining a continuous series of blocks (RecX 
Technologies Limited, n.d., p. 10). RecordsKeeper employs a mining diversity factor of 
0.2, which means that in a community of 100 miners, each time a miner mines a new 
block he/she would have to wait for 20 blocks to be mined before mining another block 
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(RecX Technologies Limited, n.d., p. 10). Thus, permissioned miners would be rotated 
within the algorithm. 
 The mining diversity parameters, a safeguard implemented to protect against the 
possibility of someone launching a 51% attack, might actually make it easier for miners 
to tamper with blocks as well (MultiChain, 2018a). Given that a node can possibly 
predict the next block it will mine, an attacker may use that prediction to tamper with 
transactions in two ways (MultiChain, 2018a). First, the attacker could use their node to 
willfully censor a transaction, thereby delaying its confirmation until the next block 
generated by an honest miner (MultiChain, 2018a). The second way can occur when two 
conflicting transactions are waiting to be confirmed (MultiChain, 2018a). Normally, the 
first of the two transactions to be confirmed by multiple nodes is validated, while the 
other is invalidated and orphaned (MultiChain, 2018a). However, in this case, the 
attacker can use the node to decide, based on preference, which of the two transactions 
ought to be confirmed (MultiChain, 2018a). 
 Another potential issue with the permission-based consensus scheme is its 
reliance on designated administrators to determine mining permissions. None of the 
documentation for RecordsKeeper clarifies exactly who the administrators are and how 
they attain administrative status. It is unclear from the RecordsKeeper documentation if 
admin status is relegated strictly to RecordsKeeper administrators or if users adopting 
RecordsKeeper for records management obtain admin status as well. If the latter is the 
case, would each client receive one node with admin status? Or would larger companies 
that claim multiple nodes in the network procure multiple nodes with administrative 
status? It is difficult to ascertain how the admin permissions would be attained or 
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distributed, and thus, difficult to understand how much influence a particular party might 
have to grant or deny mining permissions. It is also unclear as to whether there are any 
guidelines the admin must follow regarding granting or denying these permissions. 
Without more transparency regarding these admin factors, it is difficult to determine 
whether or not the system would be safe from collusion between a/an administrator(s) 
and the several nodes to which they grant mining permissions.  
 Because stream items are encoded into block transactions, they receive the same 
protections as any other blockchain transaction. This means that records that are 
published in streams are as immutable as the blockchain. Furthermore, each record 
published in a stream will exist in every node along the network. Every stream item on 
the blockchain will thus be saved by every network node, regardless of whether or not 
that node is subscribed to the stream. This process will ensure multiple copies of the 
record exist, ensuring preservation regardless of whether or not the original publisher 
node leaves the system or is corrupted.  
 With regards to completeness after creation, the renderability and interpretability 
of records may be compromised in RecordsKeeper, as records that are stored in the 
RecordsKeeper platform must adhere to particular file formats. If a company has all of 
their files in JSON, XML, or any of the other recommended file formats, then their files 
and data may be preserved in the original file format within the RecordsKeeper stream. 
However, if the original files are images, PDF files, or some other format not 
recommended for direct preservation into the RecordsKeeper stream, the files must be 
reformatted before being uploaded and published to the stream. This is problematic for a 
user seeking retrieval of the original electronic file.  
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 For example, an image file could not be stored in RecordsKeeper in its original 
format, but would need to be rendered into a binary hexadecimal format (Multichain, 
2018b). While the record key or transaction id would pull up the necessary information 
for a user to retrieve and verify that record of the image from the stream, the record 
would need to further indicate and/or provide whatever tools were necessary to render the 
binary hexadecimal into a viewable image. However, if an actual copy of the original 
image file is required, then the user must be able to access the off-chain, off-system 
repository where the original record is archived.  
 Currently, there is no indication in RecordsKeeper’s documentation as to how 
original records might be accessed by other individuals. Moreover, there is no clear sense 
of how an audit trail would be generated between records saved in the preferred file 
formats on the RecordsKeeper streams and the original records in their original file 
formats that are preserved in their institutional repositories. Thus, for users whose files 
are originally formatted in simple text, Objects, JSON, XML, or Hex, RecordsKeeper 
does enable them to store, share, and verify their records with others through the 
platform. For others users whose records are otherwise formatted, RecordsKeeper is not 
exactly allowing them to store, share, and verify the original electronic record, but an 
altered version of it. Depending on the use case, this may entirely defeat the purpose of 
uploading and sharing records through the RecordsKeeper platform.     
 Though RecordsKeeper does not automatically encrypt records as they are 
uploaded, it does provide users the option to do so, either prior to upload or through the 
symmetric encryption offered through the streams. Oddly enough though, because stream 
data is stored on every node, each node can access the data through their disk drive, 
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rendering read permissions ineffective and thus, absolutely requiring encryption of 
sensitive data. Thus, while means for confidentiality are provided, the urgency for 
confidentiality is also inherently implicated within the stream storage system. With 
regards to the physical integrity of the records, permission-based consensus model 
provides an efficient and viable solution to preventing a 51% attack for a newly started 
blockchain like RecordsKeeper. The mining diversity factor, which enables the round-
robin mining of blocks, however, is not completely tamper-proof. Likewise, neither is the 
proof-of-work protocol RecordsKeeper will eventually adopt.  
 The major threat to integrity with RecordsKeeper, however, is the inability to 
store records in their original file formats, but instead in reformatted versions. Without 
some semblance of an audit trail between the newly formatted records in the stream and 
the off-chain, off-system originals, it is unclear how records saved on the stream can 
stand in for the originals in various use cases where other users need to access and/or 
verify the original document. Likewise, RecordsKeeper provides no access to the original 
documents, should another user request it. None of those issues exist, on the other hand, 
for records that are originally managed in the preferred file formats.  
 RecordsKeeper’s use of key-value pairs and MultiChain streams provides users 
the potential to link certain records by their procedural context, thereby instantiating the 
archival bond. Users upload their records into RecordsKeeper using a key-value format, 
where the key is the record key (Greenspan, 2016). This key-value format is not to be 
confused with the public or private keys used for transactions (Greenspan, 2016). The 
record key may be named whatever the user decides (Greenspan, 2016). The value is the 
encrypted record or data (Greenspan, 2016). Because the same record key may have 
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multiple values, a user could base the record key on the procedural context—i.e. “XYZ 
event files”—and upload multiple records that belong to that aggregate under that same 
record key onto the same stream (Greenspan, 2016). Whenever someone seeks to retrieve 
those files, they would use the record key to find those files (Greenspan, 2016). So long 
as the records were published on the same stream, each record would be listed along with 
its unique transaction information—i.e. transaction id, time stamp, record hash, and any 
other metadata entered in the block (Greenspan, 2016). Moreover, it is possible to encode 
more procedural context in the name of the stream.  
 For example, if two users, say, an event planner Jolene Doe and a local business, 
Standard Business, wanted to keep a records of all events she planned for the business, 
they could open a closed stream with exclusive write permissions for both parties. They 
could name it Standard Business Events planned by J. Doe. Then for each event she 
plans, the record key could be the event name or whatever event identification number 
they choose, such as HolidayPartyDecember 2018. All records regarding the event could 
be entered by each party under that key value. Other event records could be added to the 
same stream under different record keys—e.g. Sal’sRetirementParty, 
SB10YearAnniversity, etc. Given the issues mentioned above, this would work best in 
cases where records are already in the accepted standard formats mentioned or where 
standard formatted versions of records are acceptable substitutes.  
 In terms of confidentiality, RecordsKeeper provides options to ensure encryption, 
even though the onus to do so is placed upon the user. With regards to authenticity, 
RecordsKeeper provides a way to instantiate the archival bond in certain use cases and 
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moderate protections for integrity. Thus, RecordsKeeper earns a medium rating for 
security. 
 
Trust 
 As with most blockchain-based platforms that require users to upload records 
created off-chain, complete accuracy is difficult to ensure. It is the responsibility of the 
user to ensure that s/he has uploaded the correct record with its correct record ID and 
accompanying metadata into the RecordsKeeper system. While the added functionality of 
streams enables users to group particular records together to preserve the archival bond, it 
also produces another potential opportunity for error. In particular, users publishing 
records must ensure that they publish the records onto the correct streams (in situations 
where they might be subscribed to multiple streams) and that they also select the accurate 
record key. If a record is to be aggregated with other records under a particular record 
key, or conversely isolated from other record groups, then it is important that the correct 
record key is used. Otherwise, it could be problematic for later retrieval by both the user 
and/or any other agencies seeking the record on the particular stream and/or under a 
particular record key. To avoid such issues, users will need to maintain some 
documentation regarding their record key naming systems. 
 The key-value system also provides an opportunity to try to correct certain errors. 
For example, if an error has been made on Record A, which is listed under the record key 
“Group 1,” then the corrected record could be added to the same Group 1 record key, 
with notation of the correction. The correction would be visible to users who pull up the 
entire record key list. However, if a user simply searches out the record by its particular 
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transaction ID, then the corrected record will not appear, as only the specific record 
corresponding to the transaction ID is pulled up, and not the entire group of records.  
 RecordsKeeper offers little in terms of reliability. Completeness at the point of 
creation is beyond the scope of RecordsKeeper as many records are created off-chain. For 
example, in a supply-chain records use case, RecordsKeeper does not have a way to 
verify assets have changed hands in the real world. Someone must enter a record of the 
transactions that occurred off chain. Consistency with the formal rules of creation is also 
problematic in the RecordsKeeper context, as records originally in more dense formats—
i.e. images, audio recordings, PDF files, etc.—are reformatted and saved into the system 
that way. Thus, the records made within RecordsKeeper are not consistent.  
 Given its inability to ensure accuracy or reliability of records, RecordsKeeper 
earns a low rating for trust.   
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5 Discussion 
 Based on the low results of the ARCHANGEL and RecordsKeeper assessments 
(See Table 1), one can conclude that blockchain-based platforms for recordkeeping at this 
point in time might just be more hype than help. Neither of the two blockchain-based 
recordkeeping platforms earned high ratings. ARCHANGEL earned a “Low” rating for 
all three criteria, while RecordsKeeper was able to manage a “Medium” rating for 
security. To better explain these results, the discussion section will provide a comparative 
analysis of each criterion in the study and contextualize these results in terms of T. D. 
Smith’s evaluations of blockchain-based platforms. Finally, based on these analyses, 
suggestions for improving Smith’s evaluation framework are provided.    
Project	   Dependability	   Security	   Trust	  
ARCHANGEL	   Low	   Low	   Low	  
RecordsKeeper	   Low	   Medium	   Low	  
Table 1: Assessment results 
 The first criterion, dependability, had two major aspects the platforms had to 
address: availability and maintainability. As the evaluations above demonstrated, 
determining availability for a blockchain platform largely hinges upon how the platform 
manages to get nodes to continue to validate and store transactions. Without the nodes 
validating the transactions, the blockchain ceases to continue. Moreover, the nodes 
provide redundancy as they continue to store the latest version of the chain, so long as the 
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blockchain is running. In order to determine availability, therefore, the stakeholder needs 
to know the following information related to the blockchain: proposed consensus 
protocol, blockchain type (i.e. public/private, permissioned/permissionless), intended 
participants, and proposed incentive for miners. Knowing the consensus mechanism 
enables one to understand just how extensive a network of nodes one might need, as well 
as costs for upholding such a network. Knowing the type of blockchain one is proposing 
and what type of participants are sought for the blockchain then makes it easier to 
understand whether or not the proposed incentive is actually viable.  
 ARCHANGEL, for example, proposed to use a proof-of-work consensus 
protocol. The proof-of-work protocol requires a large network of nodes to validate the 
transactions on the blockchain and is very expensive to maintain. Smaller networks with 
lower numbers of nodes run the risk of a double-spend or 51% attack, as mentioned 
earlier. ARCHANGEL’s permissioned ledger model proposed either using only archives 
and memory institutions as miners or using a public blockchain to enable anyone to mine 
the blockchain. This proves to be problematic on multiple levels. In the first instance, 
while the transparency regarding the integrity of their public documents might serve as 
sufficient incentive for archives and memory institutions to join the platform, the costs of 
proof-of-work protocols are quite high for these generally resource-strapped institutions. 
In the latter model, there is very little incentive for non-archival participants to join the 
network. Even for individuals who would be interested in checking the integrity of 
particular documents, the cost of mining would likely be more expensive than verifying 
the integrity of a public document. Availability could likely have been improved had 
ARCHANGEL chosen a different consensus mechanism, such as proof-of-stake or 
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Byzantine Fault Tolerance, both of which actually work more efficiently and cost-
effectively with permissioned and private blockchains.  
 RecordsKeeper, though opting for a different permissioned-consensus model until 
it builds its network of nodes, seeks to use proof-of-work, as well. Unlike 
ARCHANGEL, RecordsKeeper does provide an incentive to all its miners—its own 
XRK utility tokens. Unfortunately, the problem with this is that the utility tokens appeal 
primarily to the users of the RecordsKeeper platform. As the tokens cannot be used for 
transactions outside of the platform, it is hard to predict if miners not directly using the 
platform for records storage would really want to collect the utility tokens just based on 
potential speculative value on the cyptocurrency exchange. Thus, in terms of availability, 
both platforms scored low.  
 Evaluation of maintainability requires consideration of the changes and/or repairs 
the entire system will undergo over its lifetime. Both ARCHANGEL and RecordsKeeper 
did not sufficiently address how proposed changes or repairs would be addressed. One 
key issue regards documents being stored off-chain in repositories. While the 
maintenance of participating repositories is out of the scope of ARCHANGEL, their 
continued participation in ARCHANGEL is not. The hash records on the blockchain lose 
their value without the documents to compare them with. If a member institution is 
destroyed along with its records, or a participating institution decides to quit the 
ARCHANGEL project, those documents are no longer available. Not only is this an 
availability issue, but as records cannot be deleted from the chain, it becomes a 
maintenance issue. More pointedly, in the hypothetical situation where a document 
collection from a participating archive is transferred to another participating institution, 
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then how would the institutional transfer be denoted within the system? Would entirely 
new records be created denoting new ownership? Would those be linked to the previous 
records? ARCHANGEL does not as yet have any solutions to these issues.  
 ARCHANGEL also proposes future improvements such as new content hashing 
algorithms, as well as a possible membership subscription model. If institutions wish to 
update the previously hashed documents with the new content hashes, then, once again, 
some solution regarding how such changes will be noted within the append-only 
blockchain will need to be addressed. Similarly, should ARCHANGEL choose to adopt a 
membership subscription model, some level of administrative management will be 
required. Currently, none of their materials address these issues.  
 RecordsKeeper had an even greater issue regarding scalability of its storage. 
Unlike ARCHANGEL, or many other blockchain platforms for that matter, 
RecordsKeeper’s use of MultiChain streams means that all record data that participants 
upload to streams, regardless of whether or not the data is on or off the chain, will end up 
being stored in every single node in the network. As participants—and, more importantly, 
the amount of files they upload—increase, the storage capacity of nodes will continue to 
decrease until eventually the node is unable to continue storing the data. RecordsKeeper 
has presented no solution for this problem at this time.   
 Security according to Smith’s rubric hinges upon two aspects: authenticity and 
confidentiality. As with attempts to examine dependability, knowing the blockchain type, 
intended participants, and consensus model is required in order to properly evaluate 
security. Confidentiality for ARCHANGEL and RecordsKeeper could be evaluated in 
terms of maintaining the confidentiality of the users and of the records. With regards to 
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determining the confidentiality of users, one must know the blockchain type and intended 
participants. In the case of ARCHANGEL, two different users have been proposed—any 
individual who wishes to mine the blockchain and/or verify documents, and archives and 
memory institutions. The identity of individual miners can remain private through the 
standard public and private key system.  
 Because ARCHANGEL’s proposed blockchain is a permissioned ledger, it was 
unclear whether or not participating archives and memory institutions could keep their 
identities private, should they even want to. A permissioned blockchain requires users to 
gain permissions for various actions—i.e. to upload hash records. As a result, the 
administrators of the blockchain must know their identities. It is unclear from 
ARCHANGEL’s documentation whether there will be a central administrative body, and, 
if so, how that body is determined. The documentation is also unclear as to the technical 
specifications of how such permissions will be managed.  Moreover, as one of the main 
points of the hash records is to provide more transparency to the preservation practices of 
these institutions, it would seem counterintuitive for the identities of participating 
institutions to remain private. As a matter of provenance, furthermore, the identity of the 
institution submitting a hash record on the blockchain should be transparent.  
 ARCHANGEL does not provide much by way of records encryption, either, 
though encryption of hash records seems somewhat contrary to the enterprise. In terms of 
the documents the hash records refer to, confidentiality of sensitive information is 
handled by the participating institution that is preserving the document.  
 Confidentiality in RecordsKeeper is a little less complex. The platform is modeled 
as a public blockchain wherein all users can remain pseudonymous by the public-private 
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key cryptographic system. Confidentiality of records is, for the most part, completely up 
to the user in the RecordsKeeper platform. RecordsKeeper does not provide any 
automated service to encrypt one’s records upon upload to the system. Users must ensure 
that they encrypt any sensitive documents and information, as whatever is saved directly 
onto the blockchain is visible to all users of the platform. Moreover, with the underlying 
MultiChain streaming architecture that saves all steam items on every node, all records 
uploaded to the platform are technically accessible by any node through its hard disk. 
This seems problematic for users dealing with records containing sensitive information—
should they forget to encrypt their records, or if somehow their encryption key is stolen, 
then a hacker with a node in the system could access all their records through his/her own 
node’s hard disks.   
 Of all the aspects to assess, authenticity is perhaps the most complex, as it 
requires one to examine the integrity and identity of records within the system. Integrity 
is further split into physical integrity and interpretability. In order to assess the physical 
integrity of records in a blockchain-based system, it is necessary to know the consensus 
protocol being used to validate the blockchain transactions. In this regard, both 
ARCHANGEL and RecordsKeeper propose to use the proof-of-work algorithm, which is 
still considered by some to be near immutable, to protect the physical integrity of on-
chain records. But as the recent spate of 51% attacks has shown, such attacks are 
becoming more common and not as difficult to execute. In a bid to deflect such attacks, 
which are easier to execute on networks with lower numbers of nodes, RecordsKeeper 
does propose to operate on a permissions-based consensus model with a mining diversity 
algorithm until the network grows. As seen in the evaluation above, however, there are 
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vulnerabilities with this method as well. Thus, neither platform can guarantee the 
physical integrity of their records.  
 Interpretability is also somewhat problematic for both platforms.  
ARCHANGEL’s hash records seem fairly straightforward to understand, assuming that 
the information is properly labeled and formatted consistently throughout the system. The 
GUID and metadata provide the information and context necessary to connect the content 
hash to its related public document. One issue, however, is that the content hash records 
should always include the content hashing algorithm, so there is no confusion for future 
users as to what algorithm was used. As Collomosse et al. (2018) discuss the possibility 
of adding more content-specific hashes to the system beyond the current SHA-256 
default, it will become imperative that all records—even those that are default SHA-
256—specify the hashing algorithm used. Otherwise, future users will not be able to 
properly interpret the content hash and correctly verify documents.  
 Interpretability, specifically in terms of renderabilty, might be diminished by 
RecordsKeeper’s preferred file formats for uploading records. Files such as PDF files, 
image files, and audio files must be reformatted to simpler binary formats to be uploaded 
into the RecordsKeeper platform. Users seeking an image file would find a file stored in 
binary hexadecimal format that they would then need to be able to render into an image 
on their systems. While this might suit the user’s purposes, in most situations where a 
user needs the original document in its original format, this does not work. 
RecordsKeeper does not provide any information of how original records in original 
formats can be shared among users.   
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 The other aspect of authenticity is identity. According to Lemieux (2017b), it is 
difficult to ensure identity without being able to establish the archival bond. Lemieux also 
notes that archival bond is often beyond the purview of most blockchain platforms 
(2017b). This certainly is the case with ARCHANGEL. Though hash records provide 
fields for metadata, metadata alone cannot establish the archival bond between the hash 
record and its document, or to other hash records. Moreover, the archival bond among 
off-chain documents cannot be instantiated in the blockchain.  
 Despite its inability to guarantee tamper-proof record storage, RecordsKeeper’s 
use of key-value pairs in conjunction with MultiChain streams did enable the platform to 
instantiate the archival bond in certain use cases. Moreover, as the same MultiChain 
stream technology enables storage of records (in certain formats) on every node, the 
multiple copies of the records grant better assurance of the long-term security of these 
records. Because RecordsKeeper was able to demonstrate some assurances regarding 
confidentiality of users, identity and redundancy of records, it received a ranking of 
medium for security.  
 Both platforms also have difficulty addressing the last of the three criteria, trust. 
This was to be expected, as Lemieux had noted that accuracy and reliability typically fall 
beyond the scope of blockchain-based recordkeeping solutions (2017b). ARCHANGEL 
and RecordsKeeper are no exception. As both platforms demonstrate, accuracy is 
difficult to guarantee when off-chain records are involved. In the case of ARCHANGEL, 
it is possible that incorrect or incomplete information might mistakenly be entered into 
the metadata fields of the hash record. Similarly, another potential source of error would 
be an incorrect document GUID or duplicate document GUID’s for two different hash 
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records. Not only could these inaccuracies cause confusion and false results when 
comparing hash records in the future, they could also result in the inability to access the 
correct hash record and/or correct document altogether. Lastly, ARCHANGEL’s use of 
smart contracts could lead to errors, as sometimes the code does not accurately execute 
the intended actions.  
 Similarly, RecordsKeeper has many opportunities to generate inaccurate records, 
as records are produced off-chain and then must be uploaded to the system. In general, 
there is always the chance for someone to upload the wrong record, thus ensuring the 
wrong content for the record. As RecordsKeeper requires record entries to be uploaded 
onto MultiChain streams in key-value format, there is further chance for mislabeling 
records, as the user could enter the wrong key or mistype/misspell the key name, upload 
inaccurate or incomplete records, and/or upload the record onto the wrong stream(s). This 
could make later retrieval for both the user and any other agencies seeking the record on 
the particular stream or under a particular record key. Fortunately, the key-value system 
does potentially afford the opportunity to post corrections, by linking a corrected record 
into the same record key. However, such corrections would only be visible if a user 
searched records by record key name, thereby pulling up all the records named with the 
same record key. If, on the other hand, a user looks up a specific record by the particular 
transaction ID, then only the specific record corresponding to the transaction ID is pulled 
up, and not the entire group of records with the corrected record.  
 In order for the platforms to prove their records are reliable, the records had to 
demonstrate all three of the following traits: completeness at the point of creation, 
consistency with the formal rules of creation, and naturalness. If just one of those traits is 
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absent, then the record is not reliable. Both platforms had difficulty demonstrating 
completeness at the point of creation. In the case of ARCHANGEL, the content hash 
records need to be able to demonstrate that the content hash is the accurate hash of the 
document to which it refers. Nothing inherent in the record proves that it represents the 
document referred to in the record by the document GUID. The hash must match another 
hash created from the same document with the same algorithm to prove that it is in fact 
the hash record of that document. Thus, ARCHANGEL’s hash records lack completeness 
at the point of creation and are not reliable.     
 RecordsKeeper cannot ensure reliability, either. For the most part, records are 
generated off-chain and then uploaded onto the RecordsKeeper platform in their 
preferred file formats. Reformatting particular documents—such as property titles, 
certifications, and photo identifications—into JSON, XML, or any of the other preferred 
formats runs the risk of removing the legitimating aspects of the record, i.e. the 
signatures, official seals, photo image, etc. Not only does this mean the record is no 
longer complete at the point of creation, as it only represents the record but holds no real-
world effect per se, but records are also no longer consistent with the formal rules of 
creation. Moreover, though RecordsKeeper does propose certain use cases that might 
involve the creation of records online, no details are provided on how such online records 
would be created, monitored, or verified to ensure that the real-world actions the records 
signify have actually occurred.  
 The above rankings for ARCHANGEL and RecordsKeeper might at first blush 
not seem consistent with the higher range of scores T. D. Smith (2017) awarded to the 
Bitcoin blockchain and four other blockchain-based recordkeeping platforms: MedRec, 
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Storj, Blockchain for the Internet of Things, and Bitcoin for Decentralized Trusted 
Timestamping. However, of the blockchain-based solutions Smith (2017) evaluated, only 
one, MedRec, comes close to providing large-scale recordkeeping services for electronic 
records management and archival purposes. Storj is simply a decentralized storage 
management system for individual data—not necessarily even records. No records 
sharing or even verifying is necessary. Bitcoin for Timestamping simply considers the 
timestamp function on the Bitcoin blockchain. MedRec, on the other hand, is a 
blockchain-based platform seeking to solve electronic medical records management 
issues using blockchain. MedRec also deals with electronic records that are produced off-
chain and stored off-chain. MedRec scored “Low” in every single category (Smith, 2017, 
p. 3305). MedRec, ARCHANGEL, and RecordsKeeper, as well-intentioned as they may 
be, demonstrate that at least from an archival perspective, blockchain is not well-suited 
for long-term records management and preservation.  
 These rankings are consistent, moreover, with the broader archival context. As 
much of Victoria Lemieux’s work has demonstrated, blockchain-based records 
management platforms are generally not designed in consultation with archivists, leading 
to blockchain-based solutions that completely ignore key aspects of the long-term digital 
preservation of records (2016a).  In particular, based on the application of her own 
archival theoretic framework to a generic blockchain-based structure, Lemieux posits that 
accuracy, reliability, the archival bond, and persistence through time are all aspects of 
recordkeeping that blockchain-based recordkeeping solutions cannot fully address.   
 While the low scores earned by the platforms above are consistent with previous 
research, there are some limiting factors that may have impacted these rankings. First and 
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foremost, the knowledge used to inform these evaluations was limited to information that 
was publicly available at the time of the study. In the case of ARCHANGEL, this 
information consisted of a four-page summary of the ARCHANGEL project written by 
Collomosse et al. and blog posts posted by project partners. As ARCHANGEL is still in 
its early developmental stages, some of the criteria that are not currently addressed might 
be resolved in future versions.   
 The RecordsKeeper assessment relied upon the RecordsKeeper project white 
paper, the official website of the company, and the MultiChain website. The information 
provided by RecordsKeeper was particularly challenging, as in certain cases it was too 
general and vague, or, in other cases, a bit inconsistent. In particular, the figures and 
information provided by RecordsKeeper regarding proposed use cases only detailed 
problems and promised solutions, but gave no information regarding how such solutions 
would be reached through the platform (RecordsKeeper, n.d.-d). No technical details or 
step-by-step instructions matching the various aspects of the figures are provided. 
Similarly technical information regarding the MultiChain stream technology underlying 
the RecordsKeeper platform could not be found in RecordsKeeper materials. Fortunately 
such information is available through blogposts on the MultiChain website. 
 Inconsistencies throughout their documentation—born out of what appears to be 
lack of editing—made certain aspects even more confusing. In the description of proof-
of-work protocol of their white paper, for example, they also use the acronym for proof-
of-stake (PoS). Such inconsistencies make it difficult to be certain of the interpretation of 
their documents. 
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 Another potential limitation of this study is the fact that both of the recordkeeping 
solutions evaluated use the proof-of-work consensus model. It would be interesting to see 
how blockchain-based recordkeeping systems based on other consensus models, such as 
proof-of-stake and Byzantine Fault Tolerance, would rate using Smith’s evaluation 
framework. Likewise, including another blockchain-based recordkeeping use case—such 
as a data-sharing platform—might lend some more comparative insights. Such 
comparisons could be a direction for future research.    
 Another potential area for future research would be to use Smith’s evaluation 
framework on non-blockchain-based recordkeeping platforms. Smith’s evaluation 
framework is general enough to be applied to any recordkeeping platform, regardless of 
its use of blockchain technology. The three criteria—dependability, security, and trust—
can serve to illuminate the utility of any recordkeeping system. In fact, if stakeholders 
were to use Smith’s evaluation framework to determine whether or not to adopt a 
blockchain-based recordkeeping platform, it might be useful to apply the same 
framework to evaluate their current recordkeeping system, as well any other 
recordkeeping systems they might wish to use, blockchain or not. Such a comparative 
evaluation would enable a stakeholder to make a fully informed decision regarding what 
recordkeeping system would best fit their needs.   
 While Smith’s evaluation framework was helpful in determining how well 
ARCHANGEL and RecordsKeeper addressed the three criteria, the framework did not 
provide anything unique to the evaluation of blockchain-based platforms. Though 
Smith’s evaluations of blockchain-based recordkeeping systems provide examples of 
evaluations for stakeholders to attempt to model their own evaluations after, no explicit 
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instructions have been provided.  To that end, based upon the evaluation of 
ARCHANGEL and RecordsKeeper, this study proposes a set of blockchain-specific 
questions a stakeholder could use to better evaluate blockchain-based recordkeeping 
platforms. First and foremost, one must be able to answer, what recordkeeping functions 
does the platform promise to perform? Second, what is the blockchain being used for, 
precisely—is it to record transactions? To store records? To verify records? Third, what 
is the consensus mechanism being used to verify transactions? As seen above, the 
consensus mechanism determines important aspects regarding dependability and security. 
Fourth, what type of blockchain is this—public, private, permissioned, and/or 
permissionless? And last, though not least: who benefits, and how, from this blockchain? 
For instance, are participants only users of the services provided by the platform, or are 
there also users who earn tokens for mining? With regards to Smith’s evaluation 
framework, answers to these basic questions about the blockchain-based recordkeeping 
platform under review will provide much of the requisite information needed to generate 
an informed appraisal. These questions would also make such evaluations simpler for 
those not familiar with blockchain technology. 
 Perhaps however, the most important question one should ask about a blockchain-
based system is whether or not it is appropriate or even necessary to use for one’s 
recordkeeping needs. Given that such systems are expensive and volatile, one must give 
serious consideration as to whether or not blockchain technology is the most appropriate 
solution for one’s needs. Various flowcharts, such as the one produced for the World 
Economic Forum by Mulligan, Warren and Rangaswami, might be useful places for 
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stakeholders to begin their initial evaluations of blockchain-based recordkeeping 
solutions (2018). 
  In addition to ascertaining whether or not blockchain technology is necessary or 
appropriate for one’s recordkeeping needs, one should consider conducting an explicit 
evaluation of the sustainability of using such blockchain-based programs. To that end, 
this study suggests adding sustainability as the fourth criteria to Smith’s evaluation 
framework. Smith’s framework never directly addresses issues related to sustainability 
and the long-term persistence of records. Instead, one might indirectly touch upon issues 
related to sustainability when examining availability. For example, in determining the 
feasibility of ARCHANGEL’s plan to attract other archives as miners to the blockchain 
network, the expense of maintaining the proof-of-work consensus protocol became a 
major flaw.   
 The addition of sustainability to Smith’s evaluation framework would force 
stakeholders to directly address issues—such as costs—that affect the long-term viability 
of such recordkeeping systems. While Smith’s evaluation framework makes no explicit 
mention of long-term viability, Lemieux does reference the importance of considering the 
“persistence through time” (Lemieux, 2017b, p. 10) of records created in blockchain-
based recordkeeping systems. Though not an explicitly linked to her taxonomy of trust, 
persistence through time does appear on the periphery of the taxonomy diagram 
(Lemieux, 2017b, p. 7). Lemieux concludes that persistence through time generally is 
beyond the scope of blockchain-based platforms, as blockchain is somewhat volatile, and 
as a relatively new technology, no one can predict its long-term viability (2017b). As one 
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of the co-founders and developers of Stanford’s LOCKSS program, David Rosenthal 
further argues:  
Sustainability is job #1 for archives. There's no point in setting up an 
archiving system and filling it with content only to have it fail after a 
decade or so. Sustainability has to be designed into both the technology 
and the organization into which it is embedded from the start if the 
contents are to survive the wide range of threats to which archived data is 
subject. Layering it on afterwards isn't going to be effective. (2018) 
 
As the above statement demonstrates, sustainability can never be a peripheral 
consideration, or an afterthought, for any archive. In fact, as Rosenthal asserts, 
sustainability is the primary consideration. As such, any recordkeeping system that 
cannot guarantee sustainable results from the beginning, cannot guarantee long-term 
persistence of records over time. As Rosenthal states, sustainability cannot be added to 
the system later. Measures to preserve records and operate sustainably must be in place 
from the start.  
 Moreover, while Rosenthal argues that sustainability is of central importance 
regarding long-term preservation for archives and memory institutions, his statements can 
also be applied to any records management system. Most records management systems 
will contain records collections that need indefinite storage; but even a collection that has 
a 10-year retention schedule needs to be managed in a recordkeeping platform that will 
be around at minimum for the next decade. Thus, any stakeholder considering storing 
their records with a recordkeeping platform will need to know how long they can expect 
their records to be safely preserved within that system.  
 To assess the long-term sustainability of a program, two factors must be 
considered: financial cost and environmental impact. As David Rosenthal so aptly states, 
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“digital preservation is primarily an economic problem” (2018). Digital preservation 
requires a long-term commitment of resources and money. Knowing what a 
recordkeeping system will cost to set up and run annually is a key factor in establishing 
the system’s viability as an option for the long-term storage of records. Stakeholders need 
to know not only what finances and resources they are committing in the near future to 
the new platform, but estimated costs for the next 10 years, 20 years, and so on. Without 
such practical information, stakeholders will not be able to determine if they have enough 
funds (or could procure enough funds) to ensure long-term preservation. Thus, 
stakeholders need to ascertain the actual costs of computing equipment required, 
electricity costs to power their program, storage costs, and any other resources that would 
need to be allocated to the recordkeeping platform. While it is hard to imagine that most 
stakeholders would not examine the costs associated with any new platform under 
consideration, by making it an explicit criterion in the evaluation framework, potential 
users would need to scrutinize such costs more directly. In so doing, potential users 
would likely become aware of blockchain’s high electricity consumption, an important 
hidden cost that has great ramifications for long-term sustainability.  
 Environmental impact is another important issue to consider in terms of 
blockchain-based programs. Though often ignored or downplayed by blockchain 
enthusiasts and cryptocurrency investors, blockchain technology consumes a lot of 
energy and, as a result, emits a huge amount of CO2 emissions into the atmosphere. 
Current estimates by Digiconomist (n.d.-a) regarding Bitcoin blockchain’s carbon 
emissions are a staggering 241.91 kg of CO2 per transaction and 22,293 kilotons of CO2 
annually. Not only is the electricity consumption by Bitcoin massive—constituting an 
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estimated 0.20% of the entire world’s electricity consumption—but most of it is powered 
by coal, an especially potent source of CO2 emissions (Digiconomist, n.d.-a). As climate 
change continues to get worse, consumers should be aware of their energy consumption 
both in terms of amount and type (clean or dirty). In a sense, assessing environmental 
impact ensures that there will be future users of the records an institution works so hard 
to preserve.  
 Finally, it is important to state that while this paper does not provide favorable 
evidence for using blockchain-based platforms for records management, blockchain 
technology is still developing and may yet provide certain solutions otherwise not 
possible. With the amount of resources invested in blockchain, and awareness of its 
shortcomings, it is possible that some new solutions could be developed to make it more 
secure and viable. Developers continuing to work on blockchain technology might come 
up with innovations that can counter nefarious 51% attacks. For other investors, the 
shortcomings might not outstrip the potential as the decentralized nature of blockchain is 
perceived by some as the only means for solving complex social issues, such as identity 
management for homeless persons and migrant refugees (Galen et al, 2018).  
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6 Conclusion 
 This paper examined two blockchain-based recordkeeping platforms—
ARCHANGEL and RecordsKeeper—using T. D. Smith’s evaluation framework, which 
applies the secure-computing principles of Avizienis et al. and Victoria Lemieux’s 
archival theoretic framework. Application of Smith’s framework to both platforms 
yielded low rankings for each program, raising severe doubts about the capability of 
blockchain-based programs to ensure secure, accurate, reliable, long-term recordkeeping.  
 Based upon the insights gained through using Smith’s evaluation framework, this 
study also offers two suggestions for improving Smith’s evaluation framework. The first 
suggestion is the addition of a set of questions to make Smith’s evaluation more 
blockchain-specific. Such blockchain-specific questions would enable stakeholders to 
quickly identify and assesss the strengths and weakness of the proposed blockchain 
technology. The second suggestion is to add a fourth criterion to Smith’s framework, 
sustainability. Based upon two factors, financial cost and environmental impact, an 
appraisal of a system’s sustainability would enable a more practical and complete 
assessment of the long-term viability of that recordkeeping platform. Given that a 
primary focus of recordkeeping is the long-term persistence of records, sustainability is a 
crucial factor for evaluating recordkeeping platforms, particularly ones that are as 
unpredictable and expensive as blockchain-based platforms.  
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